MANTEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/23/2012 3:56 PM

Accountable Care Organizations: Can We Have Our
Cake and Eat it Too?
*

Jessica L. Mantel
I.

INTRODUCTION

The health care debate has largely focused on the provisions of
the Affordable Care Act (the ACA) aimed at expanding health
insurance coverage to all Americans, most notably the individual
mandate requirement. The ACA, however, also takes important steps
to address the companion challenge of making health care coverage
affordable by reigning in health care costs. These steps include
various initiatives under the ACA that encourage the formation of
accountable care organizations (ACOs)clinically integrated
organizations of primary care physicians and other providers that,
through various payment mechanisms, are rewarded for both raising
1
the quality and lowering the cost of care provided to their patients.
Many believe that ACOs hold great promise for achieving cost
2
savings given their financial incentives to do so. But proponents of
ACOs do not simply contend that ACOs can stabilize health care
costs; they also claim that ACOs can simultaneously improve the
quality of care provided to patients. Indeed, President Obama has
identified ACOs as an important strategy for lowering health care
3
spending while improving the quality of care. To support their
*

Assistant Professor, University of Houston Law Center. Thank you to Frank
Pasquale and Jessica Roberts and the participants at Arizona State University Law
School’s Junior Scholars Forum for their useful discussions and suggestions; and to
Emily Lawson and Matthew Mantel for their research support.
1
Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395jjj(a)(1) (West 2012); see
also Jeff Goldsmith, Accountable Care Organizations: The Case for Flexible Partnerships
Between Health Plans and Providers, 30 HEALTH AFF. 32, 33 (2011) (“Some policy
advocates believe that the way to stabilize health care costs is to engage providers in a
form of population-based cost management—that is, to compel providers to
constrain costs across the population of an entire community.”).
2
See, e.g., Anna Wilde Mathews, Can Accountable-Care Organizations Improve Health
ST.
J.,
Jan.
25,
2012,
Care
While
Reducing
Costs?,
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204720204577128901714576054
.html.
3
See Letter from Barack Obama, President of the U.S., to Edward Kennedy and
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claim, proponents point to entities such as Kaiser Permanente, the
Mayo Clinic, Intermountain Health Care, and the Geisinger Health
System, all highly integrated organizations that provide high quality
4
care at lower costs than other providers. By encouraging other
providers to form similar organizations, so the argument goes, we can
check rising health costs without resorting to rationing health care or
otherwise sacrificing the quality of care.
So can ACOs really reduce healthcare expenses without
diminishing quality? Can we have our cake and eat it too? This
Article suggests that the answer is both yes and no. ACOs clearly can
reduce costs without sacrificing quality by trimming “fat” from the
health care system and improving the treatment of patients with
chronic conditions. However, the opportunities for ACOs to achieve
savings without adversely impacting patient care likely are far fewer
than their supporters contend. In the long-term, ACOs do not
present a painless solution to the challenge of rising health care costs.
If ACOs are to effectively slow down health care inflation, they can do
so only by making some compromises in the quality of care they
provide patients, including withholding potentially beneficial care
from some patients.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II describes the
potential for providers to lower health care costs without diminishing
quality through the elimination of wasteful medical interventions and
better management of patients with chronic conditions. Part II goes
on to explain that the health care system, as currently organized, has
limited capacity to realize these potential savings. Part III explores
ACOs’ capacity to achieve what the current system has failed to do—
achieving cost savings without sacrificing quality or rationing health
care—and concludes that the optimism of ACO proponents is not
Max Baucus, Senators, U.S. Cong. (June 2, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/the-president-spells-out-his-vision-on-health-carereform/ (stating that the President’s proposals to cut health care spending include
encouraging physicians to form ACOs, which will also improve the quality of care for
Medicare patients).
4
See DAVID NEWMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41474, ACCOUNTABLE CARE
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM 3 (2010) (“ACOs are
modeled on entities seen as quality leaders in health care, such as Kaiser
Permanente, the Mayo Clinic, the Cleveland Clinic, and Geisinger Health System.
All of these exemplars are highly integrated providers . . . .”); Jenny Gold, ‘Poster Boys’
Take a Pass on Pioneer ACO Program, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 14, 2011),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/September/14/ACO-PioneersMedicare-hospitals.aspx (noting that the Mayo Clinic, Cleveland Clinic, Geisinger
Health System, and Intermountain Health Care have been touted as models for
ACOs).
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without some merit. Part IV cautions against viewing ACOs as a
painless solution to rising health care costs, arguing that although
ACOs clearly can achieve some savings without adversely impacting
quality, there are limits to their ability to do so. Part V concludes that
in the long-term ACOs cannot successfully restrain the growth in
health care costs without withholding potentially beneficial care from
some patients, and urges health care analysts and policymakers to
consider what regulatory oversight may be necessary to ensure that
ACOs ration care in a fair and equitable manner.
II. THE POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVED PATIENT CARE AND LOWER COSTS
Most physicians and patients associate more medical care with
5
higher quality care. After all, if you get what you pay for, spending
6
less on health care implies lower quality care. Influential health
policy analysts, however, present a more optimistic view, arguing that
7
we can reduce the volume and intensity of care provided in the
8
Although
United States without adversely impacting quality.
contrary to conventional wisdom, this position is not without some
merit. First, much of the medical care provided to patients is of little
9
or no value, that is, it is wasteful. Eliminating wasteful care thus
could reduce health care costs without compromising the quality of
5

See JOHN E. WENNBERG ET AL., THE DARTMOUTH INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE, TRACKING THE CARE OF PATIENTS WITH SEVERE CHRONIC ILLNESS:
THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE 11 (2008) (“Most policy makers, physicians,
and patients assume that more care is better care . . . .”); Elliott Fisher et al., Fostering
Accountable Health Care: Moving Forward in Medicare, 28 HEALTH AFF. 219, 220 (2009)
(emphasis in original), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/2
/w219.full.pdf+html (noting “the widespread belief—often in the face of relevant
evidence to the contrary—that more medical care means better medical care”).
6
See Caryl E. Carpenter et al., Issues of Cost and Quality: Barriers to an Informed
Debate, 4 J. EVALUATION IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 131, 135 (1998) (noting that “[m]any
Americans subscribe to a general maxim—you get what you pay for, including health
care. . . . Clearly, if quality of health care is defined in terms of quantity, then
spending less will mean less quality.”).
7
The intensity of care refers to the amount and complexity of services utilized
when treating a patient. See DAVID MARCINKO, DICTIONARY OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND
MANAGED CARE (2006) (defining “intensity to services”).
8
See WENNBERG, supra note 5, at 11 (concluding that expending more medical
resources and providing more care generally do not yield higher quality care).
9
See id. at 4 (“[W]e waste on overtreatment in this country . . . . “); Donald M.
Berwick, Thomas W. Nolan & John Whittington, The Triple Aim: Care, Health, and Cost,
27 HEALTH AFF. 759, 765 (2008) (“A mainstay of reduction and control of per capita
costs would be yearly initiatives to reduce waste in all of its forms . . . .”); Carpenter,
supra note 6, at 133 (arguing that our “cost problem” stems from the high cost of
inappropriate care due to clinical inefficiency).
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10

care. Many health policy analysts also argue that our health care
system can achieve savings without sacrificing quality through better
11
management of patients with chronic conditions. Specifically, they
contend that improved treatment of chronic conditions can reduce
medical expenses downstream by avoiding the care associated with
preventable complications, such as avoidable emergency room visits,
hospital admissions or readmissions, and expensive ancillary
12
services.
Unfortunately, the health care system as currently organized has
limited capacity to reduce waste or improve the management of
chronic care patients. In particular, incentives inherent in our feefor-service payment system result in a fragmented delivery system and
promote both a higher volume and intensity of care. Reducing waste
and improving patient management therefore requires fundamental
changes in how we pay for and deliver care.
A. The Waste Hypothesis
Experts contend that the U.S. health care system commonly
provides care that is wasteful. A diagnostic or treatment procedure
may be judged wasteful because it is ineffective or unsafe, provides
marginal or uncertain benefits, or results from medical error or other
13
inefficiencies.
The first categoryineffective or unsafe
careincludes tests that do not provide useful diagnostic or
14
therapeutic information and services that are not clinically effective
10

See LINDSAY A. MARTIN ET AL., INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, INCREASING
EFFICIENCY AND ENHANCING VALUE IN HEALTH CARE: WAYS TO ACHIEVE SAVINGS IN
OPERATING COSTS PER YEAR 2 (2009) (“[H]ealth care systems can indeed drive out
waste, and thereby reduce associated cost, from their systems, while maintaining or
improving quality.”).
11
See Bruce Fireman et al., Can Disease Management Reduce Health Care Costs By
Improving Quality?, 23 HEALTH AFF. 63, 64 (2004) (stating that champions of disease
management argue that improving the quality of care provided to patients with
chronic conditions can prevent costly complications and exacerbations, thereby
reducing hospitalizations and other costs).
12
See NAT’L QUALITY FORUM, WASTE NOT, WANT NOT: THE RIGHT CARE FOR EVERY
PATIENT 2, 4 (2009), available at http://www.qualityforum.org/Publications/2009/07
/Waste_Not,_Want_Not__The_Right_Care_for_Every_Patient.aspx (noting that
emergency room visits and hospital readmissions could be avoided through better
coordination of care and expanded access to primary care).
13
See Alan Garber et al., The Promise of Health Care Cost Containment, 26 HEALTH
AFF. 1545, 1547 (2007) (describing wasteful care as care that “is ineffective, is
delivered in an inefficient manner, or simply represents care of little value”).
14
See Peter Boland et al., Accountable Care Organizations Hold Promise, But Will They
Achieve Cost and Quality Targets?, MANAGED CARE 12, 14 (Oct. 2010), available at
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/1010/1010.ACOs.html (stating that
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15

in addressing a patient’s condition. It also includes care that may
provide some clinical benefit to the patient, but poses health risks
16
The second
that clearly outweigh any potential benefit.
categorycare of insufficient or uncertain benefitsincludes care
that provides only slight clinical benefit compared to the cost of such
17
care, and tests and services where the clinical benefits to a patient
18
have not yet been fully validated. The final categoryinefficient
19
and tests and
careincludes both duplicative procedures
treatments that are more costly than alternative tests and treatments
20
of similar therapeutic value.
It also includes care provided to
address either preventable complications or unnecessary harms to
patients that result from medical errors or failures to implement
21
protocols that reduce risks.
Many believe that eliminating wasteful care would produce
22
significant cost savings without diminishing the quality of care. This
so-called waste hypothesis is not without empirical support. Through
unnecessary care includes services that do not provide useful diagnostic or
therapeutic information); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Health Care Cost Containment and
Medical Technology: A Critique of Waste Theory, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 778, 785 (1986)
(“A technology is ineffective if it produces no discernible benefit to the patient.”).
15
See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The American Difference in Health Care Costs: Is There a
Problem? Is Medical Necessity the Solution?, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 13 (1999) (stating that
a test or procedure is medically unnecessary if it is not appropriate or effective for
addressing a patient’s condition); Berwick, supra note 9, at 765 (2008) (asserting
that wasteful care includes unscientific care).
16
See Mehlman, supra note 14, at 785 (“A technology or its particular use is
considered unsafe, and therefore perhaps wasteful, when its risks exceed the benefits
to the patient.”).
17
See id. at 784 (defining wasteful medical technology to include “technologies
that do not yield adequate net benefits”).
18
See Jost, supra note 15, at 13 (stating that medically unnecessary care includes
tests or procedures where the benefit to the patient is not known or not yet fully
known).
19
See Boland, supra note 14, at 14 (stating that preventable ancillary services
include duplicative procedures); Berwick, supra note 9, at 765 (stating that waste
includes procedures, tests, and visits that represent rework).
20
See Mehlman, supra note 14, at 789 (“A technology might also be regarded as
wasteful if it is expected to yield the same net benefit as another technology but at a
greater costthat is, if it is not the most efficient, cost-effective technology to treat or
to diagnose a patient’s condition.”).
21
See Boland, supra note 14, at 14 (explaining that unnecessary care includes
“[p]reventable complications: [e]vents that cause unnecessary harm to the patient
and cost to the system above and beyond the natural progression of an illness or
injury”).
22
See Jost, supra note 15, at 2 (discussing the belief that eliminating waste from
the health care system would save enormous sums of money, with perhaps the
rationing of beneficial care not necessary to check health care costs).
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their studies of chronically ill Medicare beneficiaries, John Wennberg
and his colleagues at the Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and
Clinical Practice have documented wide variation in spending across
both geographic regions and hospitals. Specifically, they found that
patients in high-spending regions and hospitals visit physicians more
frequently, make greater use of specialists, and receive more
23
diagnostic tests, procedures, and inpatient care. Despite this large
variation in the utilization and intensity of care, regions and hospitals
with lower per capita spending generally achieve aggregate patient
outcomes at least equal to their higher spending counterparts, and
24
even score higher on many quality dimensions.
Moreover, the
variation in medical spending is not attributable to differences in the
25
prevalence of disease or other population characteristics, but rather
26
reflects differences in clinical decisions. These findings suggest that
the volume and intensity of care provided to patients can be reduced
27
without adversely impacting patient outcomes.
Studies that examine the appropriateness of certain care
reinforce the Dartmouth researchers’ conclusion that a significant
23

See WENNBERG, supra note 5, at 13 (finding variation in utilization and
intensity among geographic regions and academic medical centers).
24
Wennberg and his colleagues summarized their findings on the association
between spending and quality as follows:
[A]t the population level, our research and that of others has shown
that more resources and more care (and more spending) are not
necessarily better. Patient populations with similar chronic illness,
followed over time once they become ill, do not enjoy improved
survival or better quality of life if they live in regions with more care. In
fact, the care they receive appears to be worse. They report being less
satisfied with their care than peers in regions that spend less, and
having more trouble getting in to see their physicians. The most
surprising and significant difference between regions is that mortality is
higher in high-spending regions. In other words, your chances of dying
increase in regions where the health care system delivers more care.
See WENNBERG, supra note 5, at 4. Wennberg and his colleagues found similar results
among high-spending and low-spending hospitals. See id. at 54. They hypothesized
that the higher mortality rates observed in higher-spending regions and hospitals
stems from the fact that most medical treatments pose some risk, and the more care
a patient receives (particularly hospital-based care), the greater the risks. Moreover,
as care becomes more complex, with more and more physicians involved,
miscommunication and errors are more likely. See id. at 13.
25
See id. at 3 (noting that differences in the level of illness account for only a
small fraction of the variation in the amount of care delivered).
26
See id. at 15 (hypothesizing that higher utilization results from differences in
clinical decisions in the “gray areas” of medicine, with those practicing in areas with
higher capacity showing a clinical preference toward greater intensity).
27
Id. at 12 (“Our studies consistently show that more resources and greater
utilization of medical care do not result in better outcomes.”).
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portion of medical care provided in the United States is unnecessary.
For example, one recent study found that fifty-three percent of
patients undergo an artery-clearing procedure following a heart
attack even though research shows that the procedure offers no
benefit and the national guidelines issued by the American Heart
Association and American College of Cardiology state that the
28
procedure should not be performed.
Physicians also regularly
prescribe antibiotics for pharyngitis (sore throat), despite research
29
Experts also
showing very little evidence of its effectiveness.
estimate that at least one-third, and perhaps as many as half, of the
30
seventy million CT scans performed each year are unnecessary.
These findings further support the contention that we can
significantly lower health care costs without harming quality simply by
eliminating wasteful care.
Although estimates of the amount of wasteful care provided in
31
the U.S. vary, most agree that it is substantial, perhaps as high as
32
If correct, reducing or eliminating this wasteful
thirty percent.
medical care could yield significant cost savings, perhaps rendering
unnecessary the need to ration health care in order to check rising
33
costs.
B. Better Management of Patients with Chronic Conditions
Many health care experts contend that improving the
management of patients with chronic conditions offers a second
28

See Michelle Fay Cortez, Guidelines Don’t Curb Unnecessary Treatment for Heart
Attack Patients, BLOOMBERG (July 11, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://mobile.bloomberg.com
/news/2011-07-11/guidelines-don-t-curb-unnecessary-treatment-for-heart-attackpatients.
29
See Jamie C. Brehaut et al., Do Physician Outcome Judgments and Judgment Biases
Contribute to Inappropriate Use of Treatments? Study Protocol, 2 IMPLEMENTATION SCI. 18,
21 (2007) (discussing overuse of antibiotics for treatment of sore throats).
30
See Melody Petersen, Over Exposed: The Startling Truth About CT Scans, GOOD
HOUSEKEEPING, July 2010, at 144 (discussing overuse of CT scans).
31
See Robert A. Berenson, Shared Savings Program for Accountable Care
Organizations: A Bridge to Nowhere?, 16 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 721, 721 (2010)
(“Although experts dispute the exact amount of wasted spending, it is generally
thought to be substantial.”).
32
See WENNBERG, supra note 5, at 4 (“Various estimates for the amount we waste
on overtreatment in this country range between twenty to thirty cents on every health
care dollar spent.”); Garber, supra note 13, at 1545 (“[S]everal broad strands of the
health literature suggest that spending could be reduced by as much as 30 percent
without adversely affecting health.”).
33
See Jost, supra note 15, at 2 (discussing the belief that eliminating waste from
the health care system would save enormous sums of money, perhaps with the
rationing of beneficial care not necessary to check health care costs).
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opportunity for lowering costs without adversely impacting quality.
Many Americans suffer from chronic health conditions such as
hypertension, high cholesterol, heart disease, and diabetes, with
more than a quarter of the population suffering from multiple
34
35
conditions.
These patients often see multiple clinicians, take
numerous drugs, and may require frequent hospitalizations and
36
ancillary services.
Not surprisingly then, chronic conditions are
expensive to treat and account for a disproportionately large share of
health care spending, with as much as two-thirds of total health care
spending directed toward the quarter of Americans with multiple
37
chronic conditions. Reducing the intensity and volume of health
care consumed by those with chronic conditions thus represents a
primary target for those seeking to rein in health care costs. In
particular, experts argue that chronic-care patients often require
costly care to treat avoidable complications, and that reducing these
complications through better patient management would yield
significant cost savings.
Numerous studies have shown that those with chronic

34

See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., HHS Issues New
Strategic Framework on Multiple Chronic Conditions (Dec. 14, 2010), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/12/20101214a.html.
Two-thirds of
Medicare beneficiaries suffer two or more chronic conditions, with twelve percent
having six or more chronic conditions. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
CHRONIC CONDITIONS AMONG MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES 10 (2011), available at
http://www.cms.gov/TheChartSeries/Downloads/ChartbookFinal.pdf (based on
2008 data).
35
See Jeff Luck et al., What is the Business Case for Improving Care for Patients with
Complex Conditions?, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 396, 396 (2007) (discussing treatment
of patients with multiple chronic conditions).
36
See ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., CHRONIC CARE: MAKING THE CASE FOR
ONGOING
CARE
12
(2010),
available
at
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/50968chronic.care.chartbook.pdf (“People with
multiple chronic conditions have substantially more physician contacts, use more
prescription drugs, and are more likely to be hospitalized each year . . . .”).
37
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MULTIPLE CHRONIC CONDITIONS: A
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 10 (2010), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ash/initiatives
/mcc_framework.pdf (“The resource implications for addressing multiple chronic
conditions are immense: 66% of total health care spending is directed toward care
for the approximately 27% of Americans with multiple chronic conditions.”). See
generally CATHERINE CRAIG ET AL., INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, CARE
COORDINATION MODEL: BETTER CARE AT LOWER COST FOR PEOPLE WITH MULTIPLE
HEALTH
AND
SOCIAL
NEEDS
2
(2011),
available
at
http://asmdc.org/members/a76/attachments/IHICareCoordinationModelWhitePa
per2011.pdf (“Individuals with chronic conditions consume a high proportion of
health care services; chronic conditions are expensive to treat and a major driver of
increased health care spending.”).
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conditions often receive poor quality care. The Institute of Medicine
has found that physicians often fail to follow recommended protocols
38
For example,
when treating patients with chronic conditions.
although cardiologists generally follow clinical guidelines more than
other specialists, studies have found that they only do so seventy
39
percent of the time. These patients also see multiple physicians who
far too often provide conflicting medical advice or prescribe
40
incompatible or contraindicated drugs. In addition, chronically ill
patients frequently do not receive the necessary support and patient
education they need to ensure that they adhere to recommended
41
medication or self-care regimens. For many patients, then, their
chronic conditions are poorly controlled or go untreated, leading to
42
acute complications in many cases.
The exacerbation of chronic illness often results in the need for
costly care, including emergency department visits and
43
hospitalizations. Experts contend that some of this care could be
avoided through better management of patients’ chronic

38

See COMM. ON QUALITY HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE
QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 10 (2001) (noting that
despite the development of evidence-based guidelines for many chronic conditions,
there exists tremendous variability in practice); see also Deborah Peikes et al., Effects of
Care Coordination on Hospitalization, Quality of Care, and Health Care Expenditures Among
Medicare Beneficiaries, 301 JAMA 603, 604 (2009) (“[C]hronically ill beneficiaries often
do not receive treatment that has been shown to be effective for their conditions.”).
39
See NAT’L QUALITY FORUM, supra note 12, at 4.
40
See Luck, supra note 35, at 396 (stating that patients with chronic conditions
are at risk of receiving potentially conflicting treatment strategies); Peikes, supra note
38, at 603–04 (“Chronically ill patients often see multiple physicians . . . who may be
incompletely aware of each other’s care, prescribe incompatible or contraindicated
treatments, or provide conflicting advice.”).
41
See Bodenheimer et al., Patient Self-management of Chronic Disease in Primary Care,
288 JAMA 2469, available at http://wmhcc.org/workfiles/mh_professional/Patent
_Self-Management.pdf (discussing studies showing that physicians often fail to
provide chronically ill patients with adequate information); INST. OF MED. OF THE
NAT’L ACADS., LIVING WELL WITH CHRONIC ILLNESS: A CALL FOR PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION
410 (2012), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13272 (noting
that one reason for patient non-adherence is inadequate patient education).
42
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE ON DISEASE
MANAGEMENT
PROGRAMS
2
(2004),
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/59xx/doc5909/10-13diseasemngmnt.pdf (explaining the meaning of disease management).
43
For example, studies have found that chronically ill patients’ noncompliance
with prescribed medication regimens leads to negative health consequences,
including hospital admissions. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 38,
at 410 (2012).
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44

conditions. For example, asthma eventsthe leading cause of trips
to the emergency room among teenagers—could be drastically
reduced through better patient monitoring and adherence to
45
treatment protocols. Similarly, proper management of patients with
congestive heart failure (CHF) following their discharge from a
46
hospital could significantly reduce the rate of hospital readmissions.
Not surprisingly, health policy analysts have long argued that
improving the quality of care provided to the chronically ill will yield
cost savings by preventing costly, urgent treatment. The health care
literature includes numerous examples supporting this position. For
example, several studies have found that chronic disease selfmanagement programsprograms designed to improve patients’
self-management of their illnessescan reduce the use and cost of
47
health services. Similarly, CareSupport, a state Medicaid initiative in
Oregon, yielded annual savings of $5,000 for each participating
48
Medicaid beneficiary through better coordination of their care.
CareSupport generated these savings while maintaining or improving
49
the patient’s quality of life. Executing similar strategies throughout
the health care system thus has the potential to lower costs while
maintaining or even improving patient outcomes.

44

See JACK MEYER & BARBARA MARKHAM SMITH, HEALTH MGMT. ASSOCS., CHRONIC
DISEASE MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE OF PREDICTABLE SAVINGS 2 (2008), available at
http://www.idph.state.ia.us/hcr_committees/common/pdf/clinicians/savings
_report.pdf (claiming that interventions targeting chronically ill patients achieve
savings through reduced hospitalizations and emergency department use).
45
See Boland, supra note 14, at 15 (2010) (noting that asthma events are the
number one reason for teenage admission to the emergency room, and that most
could be avoided with better-understood treatment protocols and mobile monitoring
technology).
46
See Berwick, supra note 9, at 759 (“[W]ell-designed demonstration projects
have shown for years that the rate [of readmission for Medicare beneficiaries with
CHF] can be reduced by more than 80 percent with proper management of
patients.”).
47
See Chad Boult & Erin K. Murphy, New Models of Comprehensive Health Care for
People with Chronic Conditions, in LIVING WELL WITH CHRONIC ILLNESS: A CALL FOR
PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION, supra note 41, app. B 285, at 293 (2012) (discussing chronic
disease self-management programs).
48
See Douglas McCarthy & Sarah Klein, The Triple Aim Journey: Improving
Population Health and Patients’ Experience of Care, While Reducing Costs, 48:1421
COMMONWEALTH FUND 3 (July 22, 2010), http://www.commonwealthfund.org
/Publications/Case-Studies/2010/Jul/Triple-Aim-Improving-Population-Health.aspx
(discussing the CareSupport program).
49
See id.
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C. Why We Can’t Get There from Here: Fee-For-Service and
Fragmentation
If simply eliminating wasteful care and better managing the care
provided to chronically ill patients could solve the problem of rising
health care costs, why have we not already done so? The answer lies
in large part with the current manner in which we pay for carefeefor-service. As described below, the incentives inherent in fee-forservice promote high volume and high intensity care, discourage
efficient practices, and promote a fragmented system lacking a
coordinated approach to patient care.
Unlike most other goods and services, medical care generally is
paid for by health insurers, government insurance programs, and
50
employers, rather than the consumer-patient. Insulated from the
full cost of their medical care, patients have little incentive to
consider the cost of such care. Many patients then expect their
health care providers to provide all medical care of potential benefit,
51
no matter how slight the potential benefit or costly the care.
Physicians and other health care professionals, in turn, not only are
52
trained to “do everything possible to help patients,” but also have
53
strong economic incentives to satisfy their patients’ demands.
The manner in which payors reimburse physicians and other
health care providers further encourages the high rates of utilization.
Both private and public payors typically pay for their enrollees’ health
care on a fee-for-service basis, with providers receiving a separate
54
payment for each unit of service they provide. Basing providers’
50

See D. ANDREW AUSTIN & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34101,
DOES PRICE TRANSPARENCY IMPROVE MARKET EFFICIENCY? IMPLICATIONS OF EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE IN OTHER MARKETS FOR THE HEALTH SECTOR 910 (2008) (explaining that
hospital care and other care for complicated episodes is mostly paid for by public
health programs and private insurers).
51
See Jost, supra note 15, at 15 (“[I]f the questioned test or procedure is likely to
be of any benefit, the informed patient may expect or demand it.”); Jerry L. Mashaw
& Theodore R. Marmor, Conceptualizing, Estimating, and Reforming Fraud, Waste, and
Abuse in Healthcare Spending, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 458 (“The reliance on third-party
payments to finance medical care strengthens patients’ own bias towards using
whatever methods are available when their health is at stake.”).
52
See Mehlman, supra note 14, at 781.
53
See Gloria Bazzoli, Medical Service Risk and the Evolution of Provider Compensation
Arrangements, in UNCERTAIN TIMES: KENNETH ARROW AND THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF
HEALTH CARE 144 (Peter Hammer et al., eds., 2003) (“[I]f physicians seek profit like
other economic actors, they will satisfy patient demands under fee-for-service
payment because it holds potential for increasing their income.”).
54
See Harold D. Miller, From Volume to Value: Better Ways to Pay for Health Care, 28
AFF.
1418,
1419
(2009),
available
at
HEALTH
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payment on the quantity, and not the quality, of care rewards the
55
excessive provision of medical care. Physicians, for example, can
increase their incomes by encouraging repeat office visits or
otherwise increasing the supply of services they provide their
56
patients.
Indeed, empirical studies have documented that
physicians paid on a fee-for-service basis provide more care to their
patients than physicians paid under alternative payment models, such
57
as capitation or salary.
Hospitals similarly can increase their
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/5/1418.full.pdf+html (defining fee-forservice as paying providers a predetermined amount for each discrete service
provided). As the term is used in this Article, however, it also includes a separate
payment to a provider for bundled services, such as payments to a provider on a per
diem or per episode basis. A per diem payment involves paying an institutional
provider, such as a hospice provider, a single, fixed payment for each day of care it
provides to a patient, whereas institutional providers paid on a per episode payment
receive a single, lump sum payment that covers all care provided during a relatively
continuous episode of care. See ANNE B. CASTO & ELIZABETH LAYMAN, AM. HEALTH
INFO. MGMT. ASSOC., PRINCIPLES OF HEALTHCARE REIMBURSEMENT 7, 9 (2006), available
at http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups/public/documents/ahima/bok1
_030575.pdf. Like fee-for-service, per diem and per episode payment methodologies
give providers incentives to provide more treatments. For example, although
providers paid on a per diem basis have incentives to lower the cost care provided in
a single day, they have incentives to increase the duration of care as well as the
number of patients receiving care. See I.H. Monrad Aas, Incentives and Financing
Methods, 34 HEALTH POL’Y 205, 20910 (1995) (stating that per diem rates for
hospitals, while resulting in lower average costs per day, can stimulate use of hospitals
and prolongation of hospital stays, thereby potentially leading to higher total costs);
Marc Jegers et al., A Typology for Provider Payment Systems in Health Care, 60 HEALTH
POL’Y 255, 265 (2002), available at http://hamahangi.behdasht.gov.ir/uploads/291
_1628_Typology%20of%20Payment.pdf (noting that paying New Jersey hospitals on
a per diem basis lowered costs per diem, but the average length of stay per patient
increased). Similarly, providers paid on a per episode basis have incentives to
increase revenues by treating more cases, even though they have incentives to
control the cost of cost of individual cases. See Miller, supra, at 1419–20 (comparing
the financial incentives inherent in various payment methodologies).
55
See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., REWARDING PROVIDER PERFORMANCE:
ALIGNING INCENTIVES IN MEDICARE 2526 (2007) (discussing the incentives of the
Medicare fee-for-service payment system that result in overutilization); Miller, supra
note 54, at 1418 (“Physicians, hospitals, and other providers gain increased revenues
and profits by delivering more services to more people . . . .”); Arnold S. Relman,
Doctors as the Key to Health Care Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1225, 1225 (2009),
available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0907925 (“Most doctors
are paid on a fee-for-service basis, which is a strong financial incentive for them to
maximize the elective services they provide[,] . . . a major factor in driving up
medical expenditures.”).
56
See Bazzoli, supra note 53, at 144 (“[A]s the agent for a patient, a physician will
increase the supply of services as long as his or her marginal reimbursement exceeds
marginal costs . . . .”).
57
See Robert Town et al., Market Power and Contract Form: Evidence from Physician
Group Practices, 11 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. ECON. 115, 131 (2011) (“Numerous
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revenues by admitting more patients or expanding their services.
Fee-for-service thus encourages the provision of care of marginal or
uncertain benefits, as doing so increases providers’ incomes and
satisfies patient demands that providers do everything possible to
59
improve a patient’s health.
Fee-for-service not only promotes a higher volume of care, but it
also skews the system toward more costly interventions. Because feefor-service payment rates are largely based on the time, resources,
and expertise involved in treating a patient, more sophisticated,
labor-intensive tests and procedures garner higher payment rates
60
than less intensive interventions. Higher payments for specialized
care in turn encourage physicians to select specialized fields over
61
primary care. Because specialists are more likely to provide hightech, invasive tests and treatments, their care tends to be costly,
particularly relative to the low-tech, primary and preventive care
62
provided to chronically ill patients by primary care physicians.
Higher rates for more sophisticated care also incentivize providers to
papers have demonstrated an empirical link between FFS payment and increased
provision of services . . . .”).
58
See Berwick, supra note 9, at 761 (noting that “[u]nder current market
dynamics and payment incentives, it is entirely rational for hospitals to try to fill beds
and to expand services,” and in doing so hospitals “can protect profits best by
protecting and increasing revenues”).
59
See James C. Robinson, Theory and Practice in the Design of Physician Payment
Incentives, 79 MILBANK Q. 149, 152 (2001) (arguing that by paying for care on a piecerate basis, fee-for-service “result[s] in an input-intensive, gold-plated form of service
that expends resources as if they had no alternative uses and enjoys life as if there
were no tomorrow”).
60
See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Victor R. Fuchs, The Perfect Storm of Overutilization, 299
JAMA 2789, 278990 (2011) (commenting on the current system’s bias toward
paying significantly more for procedures, rather than for evaluation and
management).
61
See Hoangmai H. Pham & Paul B. Ginsburg, Unhealthy Trends: The Future of
Physician Services, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1586, 1590 (2007) (“[L]ow incomes for [Primary
Care Physicians] make these career paths unattractive to new physicians. Among
recent medical school graduates, a falling number choose to train in primary care
specialties . . . .”); Bryan Vaughn et al., Can We Close the Income Gap Between Specialists
and Primary Care Physicians?, 29 HEALTH AFF. 933 (2010) (explaining that because
physicians have much greater wealth potential if they choose a specialty career than
if they choose a primary care career, medical students typically choose a specialty
career over a primary care career).
62
See Mashaw, supra note 51, at 47375 (stating that “we have too many highly
trained or highly specialized [physicians]” and that “[t]his trend toward
specialization skews our medical system toward invasive and expensive interventions
and away from primary and preventive care and care-giving at a low-tech level for
those with chronic illnesses and impairments,” as high-technology medicine is
associated with specialized practice).
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63

acquire the latest medical technology. Yet many of these highly
specialized and costly interventions are no more effective than lower
64
cost, low-tech alternatives. Consequently, the greater specialization
and use of technology that results from fee-for-service often promotes
higher cost care that is of limited marginal utility.
Fee-for-service also discourages efforts to address the many
systemic inefficiencies that plague our health care system. First,
piecemeal payment for acute care hinders greater collaboration and
coordination among providers. By paying primary care physicians,
specialists, hospitals, and other providers separately for the care they
provide, fee-for-service encourages providers to operate in separate
“silos,” with each provider focusing only on the care they individually
65
provide to patients.
Moreover, fee-for-service generally pays
providers only for care provided directly to patients, and not for the
66
time required to coordinate care with other providers. Providers
thus have little incentive to coordinate the care they provide to
67
patients.
This lack of coordination, or fragmentation, among providers is
a primary cause of the poor care chronically ill patients receive, as
well as a significant contributor to the overutilization of health care.
Primary care physicians, specialists, hospitals, and other providers
often do not share with one another pertinent information about a
68
patient. For example, primary care physicians frequently do not
63

See Pham & Ginsburg, supra note 61, at 1591 (stating that financial incentives
cause physicians to favor services that are paid for particularly well over other
services, and that physicians have increased their capacity to provide diagnostic and
therapeutic procedures within their practices).
64
See, e.g., Kenneth Thorpe, The Rise in Health Care Spending and What to Do About
It, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1436, 1443 (2005) (discussing a study finding that the least costly
drug for treatment of hypertension among type 2 diabetics was as effective as the
newer, more costly drugs); G. Barbas et al., New Technology and Health Care Costs—The
Case for Robot-Assisted Surgery, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 701, 704 (2010) (stating that
existing evidence fails to show that the long-term outcomes of robot-assisted surgery
are superior to those of conventional procedures).
65
See Berwick, supra note 9, at 761 (stating that current payment incentives lead
hospitals “to focus only on care within their walls,” with readmissions due to defects
outside the hospitals deemed not their responsibility); Thomas Bodenheimer,
Coordinating Care—A Perilous Journey Through the Health Care System, 358 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1064, 1064 (2008) (noting the lack of coordination among providers).
66
See id. at 1066 (“Most dollars are paid to physicians on the basis of . . . face-toface visit time rather than the between-visit time required for care coordination.”).
67
See Bazzoli, supra note 53, at 143 (“[F]ee-for-service promotes inefficiency
because it lacks the incentives to coordinate care across providers . . . .”).
68
See Bodenheimer, supra note 65, at 1064 (summarizing studies that found that
providers often provide insufficient information to one another on a timely basis);
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provide information to their patients’ specialists, and vice versa.
This lack of communication commonly results in the duplication of
70
tests. In addition, providers who are unaware of the care provided
by other health care professionals cannot ensure that the patient
71
receives care in the lowest cost setting. The lack of coordination
also exacerbates preventable complications, particularly among
chronically ill patients. For instance, patients often do not receive
72
appropriate follow-up care after their discharge from a hospital,
increasing the likelihood of complications requiring rehospitalization. Similarly, patients seeing multiple providers may
receive different diagnoses and treatment plans for their condition,
73
or may be prescribed incompatible medications. As discussed in
Part II.C, this fragmented nature of the health delivery system
contributes to higher health care costs.
Second, fee-for-service further deters efficient practices by
penalizing providers who adopt cost-saving initiatives that reduce the
74
amount of care provided.
As noted above, under a fee-for-service
Peikes, supra note 38, at 603–04 (“Chronically ill patients often see multiple
physicians . . . who may be incompletely aware of each other’s care.”).
69
For example, one 2000 study found that pediatricians failed to provide any
information to their patients’ specialists in thirty-eight percent of referrals, and that
the specialists failed to provide the referring physician feedback forty-six percent of
the time. See Christopher B. Forrest et al., Coordination of Specialty Referrals and
Physician Satisfaction with Referral Care, 154 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED.
499, 502 tbl.1 (2000). See generally Bodenheimer, supra note 65, at 1064 (“[R]eferrals
from primary care physicians to specialists often include insufficient information,
and consultation reports from specialists back to primary care physicians are often
late and inadequate.”).
70
See Bazzoli, supra note 53, at 143 (stating that fee-for-service does not
encourage providers “to avoid costly service duplication”).
71
See id. (stating that fee-for-service does not encourage providers “to select the
lowest cost setting for care”).
72
For example, in a 2005 survey of U.S. adults hospitalized in the previous two
years for a chronic or acute illness, one-third reported that no follow-up
arrangements were made after they were discharged from the hospital. See Cathy
Schoen et al., Taking the Pulse of Health Care Systems: Experiences of Patients with Health
Problems in Six Countries, HEALTH AFF. – SUPPLEMENTAL WEB EXCLUSIVES: W5-509–W5525 (2005), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/11/28
/hlthaff.w5.509.full.pdf+html?sid=64bc4e6c-ac84-4fae-a6a4-4e27a3e7830f.
73
See Berenson, supra note 31, at 721 (noting that the fragmented care that
results from competent clinicians practicing in silos produces different diagnoses
and treatment plans and prescribing incompatible medications).
74
See Boland, supra note 14, at 16 (noting that under fee-for-service, providers
are not paid to implement proven cost savings programs). See also Berwick, supra
note 9, at 761 (explaining that hospitals have few incentives to address systemic
efficiencies that would reduce their revenues or admission rates, as doing so would
threaten hospitals’ profits).
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system, providers can increase their revenues by providing more
75
Providers therefore have little incentive to implement
services.
programs or protocols that would decrease the amount of care they
provide. For example, although studies have shown that discharge
clinics and hospitalist programs can dramatically reduce the rate of
76
hospital readmissions,
few hospitals have invested in such
77
programs. Providers also are slow to adopt protocols that reduce
the risk of complications or medical errors, particularly those that
require coordination among different providers across multiple care
78
settings. Instead, fee-for-service incentives have resulted in a health
care system primarily focused on the detection and acute treatment
79
of disease, and not the reduction of preventable health risks.
Finally, many physicians and other health care professionals lack
the capacity to adopt practices that will improve their management of
chronically ill patients or reduce inappropriate care. As noted above,
fee-for-service encourages providers to operate in separate “silos,”
with almost sixty percent of physicians practicing in solo practice or
80
group practices with fewer than ten physicians.
These small
practices generally lack the resources to implement many of the
strategies known to improve the quality of care. Perhaps most
81
importantly, few have implemented electronic medical records,
75

See supra notes 5358 and accompanying text.
See Boland, supra note 14, at 19.
77
See id. at 16 (stating that hospitals do not have financial incentives to
implement discharge clinics and hospitalist programs).
78
See, e.g., Atul Gawande, The Checklist, NEW YORKER, Dec. 10, 2007, at 86
(describing the failure of hospital ICUs to adopt a checklist proven to reduce central
line infections).
79
See Bobby Milstein et al., Analyzing National Health Reform Strategies with a
Dynamic Simulation Model, 100 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 811, 811 (2010) (commenting
that the medical industry “overemphasiz[es] disease detection and treatment while
missing opportunities to reduce preventable risk and protect people’s health”).
80
In an analysis of physician practice arrangements for 2007-2008, the American
Medical Association (AMA) found that the percentage of physicians practicing in
different types of arrangements was as follows: 24.6% in solo practice, 21.4% in
groups of two to four physicians, 12.9% in groups of five to nine physicians, 12.1% in
groups of ten to forty-nine physicians, and only 4.6% in groups of more than fifty
physicians. 21.2% of physicians were employed by hospitals and other institutions.
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, THE PRACTICE ARRANGEMENTS OF PATIENT CARE
PHYSICIANS 2007-2008: AN ANALYSIS BY AGE COHORT AND GENDER (2009), available at
www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/health-policy/prp-200906-phys-prac-arrange.pdf.
81
See Chun-Ju Hsiao et al., Electronic Health Record Systems and Intent to Apply for
Meaningful Use Incentives Among Office-Based Physician Practices: United States, 2001–
2011, NCHS Data Brief No. 79 (2011) (reporting findings from the National
Ambulatory Medical Care Survey) (“Small practices generally have less capacity to
implement electronic medical records.”). Although physicians are increasingly
76
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which can improve the coordination of care through the sharing of
82
83
patient information among providers, reduce duplicative services,
84
and promote compliance with evidence-based guidelines. Health
information technology also can help providers identify both
inefficient practices and high-cost patients that may benefit from
85
better patient management. In addition, these small practices often
lack the personnel and capacity to adopt a team approach to caring
86
for patients with chronic illness or implement clinical pathways that
would improve the quality of care.
With the current health care system unlikely to achieve cost
savings through the elimination of waste or improved patient
management, many have argued for reforming how we pay and
deliver health care. Part III discusses the leading proposal for doing
soaccountable care organizations.
III. THE CASE FOR ACOS
Many health policy analysts have concluded that we cannot
achieve cost savings through the elimination of waste and better
patient management unless we shift away from our fragmented, feefor-service system to a system where large, integrated organizations
87
assume financial responsibility for their treatment decisions. These
organizations are referred to as accountable care organizations
incorporating electronic health records (EHR) into their practices, preliminary
estimates from 2010 suggest that only one-third of physicians have an EHR system
meeting the criteria for a basic system. Id.
82
See Ashish K. Jha et al., A Progress Report on Electronic Health Records in U.S.
Hospitals, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1951, 1956 (2010) (“Use of the [electronic health] records
has also been associated with improved coordination of care through the electronic
exchange of information.”).
83
See Boland, supra note 14, at 19 (stating that a system-wide EHR can reduce
duplicative services).
84
See Menachemi & Brooks, infra note 126.
85
See Boland, supra note 14, at 13 (“Relational databases allow health plans and
medical administrators to retroactively analyze cost drivers, and predictive modeling
software can identify high expense groups.”); Brent C. James & Lucy A. Savitz, How
Intermountain Trimmed Health Care Costs Through Robust Quality Improvement Efforts, 30
HEALTH AFF. 1185, 1189 (2011) (discussing the benefits of health information
technology).
86
See Shortell & Casalino, supra note 81, at 95 (“Small practices generally . . . less
frequently use teams to care for patients with chronic illness.”).
87
See Jeff Goldsmith, Accountable Care Organizations: The Case for Flexible
Partnerships Between Health Plans and Providers, 30 HEALTH AFF. 32, 33 (2011) (“Some
policy advocates believe that the way to stabilize health care costs is to engage
providers in a form of population-based cost management—that is, to compel
providers to constrain costs across the population of an entire community.”).
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(ACOs). But proponents of ACOs do not simply contend that ACOs
can stabilize health care costs; they also claim that ACOs can
simultaneously improve the quality of care provided to patients. As
described below, their optimism is not without support.
Nevertheless, as discussed in Part IV, there is reason to believe that
ACO proponents overstate the potential for ACOs to lower costs
without adversely impacting the quality of care.
A. ACOs: An Introduction
An ACO generally is defined as a local organization comprised
of and controlled by primary care physicians, specialists, and other
providers that are jointly accountable for the cost and quality of the
88
full continuum of care delivered to a patient population.
Accountability for both cost and quality goals are achieved by paying
ACOs through an alternative payment methodology that rewards
both cost savings and improvements in care. In addition, by focusing
on providers, the ACO model imposes joint accountability for both
costs and quality at the level of actual care delivery, rather than on
89
insurers and HMOs. The ACO model thus seeks to reform health
care in two fundamental ways. First, the model would achieve
payment reform by shifting financial responsibility for the aggregate
cost of care from payors to providers, and by tying providers’
reimbursement levels to the quality of care they provide. Second, the
model reforms the delivery system by moving away from one
88

See Boland, supra note 14, at 12 (“An ACO is generally defined as a local
health care organization with a network of providers such as primary care physicians,
specialists, and hospitals that are accountable for the cost and quality of care
delivered to a particular population.”); Kelly Devers & Robert Berenson, Can
Accountable Care Organizations Improve the Value of Health Care by Solving the Cost and
Quality Quandaries?, TIMELY ANALYSIS OF IMMEDIATE HEALTH POL’Y ISSUES 1 (Oct. 2009)
(“An ACO is a local health care organization and a related set of providers (at a
minimum, primary care physicians, specialists, and hospitals) that can be held
accountable for the cost and quality of care delivered to a defined population.”);
Thomas L. Greaney, Accountable Care Organizations: A New New Thing with Some Old
Problems, HEALTH L. OUTLOOK 2 (2010) (“The ACO concept envisions a legal entity
comprised of and controlled by providers that would assume financial responsibility
for the cost and care of a defined population . . . while being subject to a variety of
quality standards and information reporting requirements.”); Mark McClellan et al.,
A National Strategy To Put Accountable Care Into Practice, 29 HEALTH AFF. 982, 982
(2010) (“ACOs consist of providers who are jointly held accountable for achieving
measured quality improvements and reductions in the rate of spending growth.”).
89
See Devers, supra note 88, at 3 (“Developers of the ACO concept also
emphasize accountability, but focus directly on health care providers and the delivery
system instead of insurers and HMOs. . . . The new approach, then, emphasizes
accountability at the level of actual care delivery.”).
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structured to manage acute health problems to a system organized
around clinically integrated providers focused on preventive care and
management of long-term health issues.
ACOs are held accountable for the cost of care delivered to a
patient population through various payment mechanisms that reward
efficiency and/or penalize inefficiency, namely shared savings, shared
90
savings and risk, and capitation. Under the shared savings model,
the ACO continues to receive fee-for-service based payments, but
payors also reward an ACO that meets or exceeds its targeted cost
91
savings with a bonus equal to a percentage of the savings.
The
shared savings and risk model similarly entitles an ACO to a
percentage of any savings, but also penalizes those who do not meet
targeted cost savings with a downward adjustment in their fee-for92
service payments. Finally, under the capitated model, in place of
fee-for-service payments an ACO would receive a single monthly
payment for each insured it cares for, thereby forcing an ACO to
93
internalize the cost of care it provides.
The ACO model also includes economic incentives for ACOs to
improve quality by tying a portion of an ACO’s reimbursement to its
94
performance on quality benchmarks. For example, an ACO that
performs poorly on the relevant quality measures may be ineligible
for any bonus payment under the shared savings or shared savings
95
and risk payment models, even if the ACO lowers the cost of care.
Public reporting of an ACO’s quality performance also promotes
holding an ACO accountable to the extent such information affects
96
an ACO’s reputation.
90

See David Balto, Making Health Reform Work: Accountable Care Organizations and
28,
2011),
available
at
Competition,
CTR. AM. PROGRESS 5 (Feb.
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/02/pdf/aco
_competition.pdf (discussing the various models for giving ACOs incentives for cost
control); see generally Chad Mulvany, Weighing the Benefits and the Risks of ACOs, 64
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 48, 48 (2010) (stating that the economic incentives in the
ACO model tie some portion of provider reimbursement to cost efficiency).
91
See Balto, supra note 90, at 5 (explaining the shared savings payment model).
92
See id. (explaining the shared savings and risk payment model).
93
See id. (explaining the capitation payment model).
94
See Mulvany, supra note 90, at 48 (stating that the economic incentives in the
ACO model tie some portion of provider reimbursement to quality benchmarks).
95
See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. 425.100(b) (2012) (stating that ACOs participating in the
Medicare shared savings program are eligible for shared savings only if they meet the
minimum quality performance standards, among other requirements).
96
See Devers, supra note 88, at 1 (“Public reporting of cost and quality
information to affect public perception of an ACO’s worth is another way of holding
the ACO accountable for its performance.”).
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Through these payment reforms, policymakers hope to shift the
health care system away from a fragmented system focused on acute
and specialized care. Under the ACO model, an ACO’s participating
providers are jointly accountable for the full spectrum of care
provided to patients (whether or not provided by the ACO’s
participating providers). The ACO model of shared accountability
thus encourages providers to look beyond the care they individually
97
provide a patient during an episode of illness.
It encourages
98
providers to “deliver more efficient and coordinated care” and focus
on patients’ long-term health, including the prevention of serious
99
health problems.
The ACO model received the imprimatur of health care reform
when it was incorporated into the Affordable Care Act as the
100
Medicare Shared Savings Program. Under the program, ACOs that
successfully lower the cost of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries
will share a portion of the savings they generate for the Medicare
101
program, provided they meet certain quality standards. In addition
to the Shared Savings Program, the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) has established the Pioneer ACO Model for
102
organizations with experience operating as ACOs.
Under this
program, participating ACOs will receive higher levels of reward and
assume greater financial risk than ACOs participating in the Shared
103
Savings Program.
In year three of the Pioneer ACO Model
program, CMS will begin testing a capitated payment model, with
eligible ACOs receiving a monthly per-beneficiary amount in lieu of
104
part of or all of the ACO’s fee-for-service payments.
97

See Jackson Williams, The “Shared Accountability” Approach to Physician Payment:
Four Options for Developing Accountable Care Organizations, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 185,
188 (2010) (explaining that the ACO model of shared accountability imposes
“accountability [for] . . . the long-term health status of patients, not simply for the
care that an individual professional delivers during a particular episode of illness”).
98
See Boland, supra note 14, at 12.
99
See Williams, supra note 97, at 188 (stating that the ACO model of shared
accountability imposes accountability for the long-term status of patients).
100
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, sec. 3022 (2010).
101
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF FINAL RULE PROVISIONS
FOR ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS
PROGRAM 4 (2011), available at https://www.cms.gov/MLNProducts/downloads
/ACO_Summary_Factsheet_ICN907404.pdf.
102
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PIONEER ACCOUNTABLE CARE
ORGANIZATION MODEL: GENERAL FACT SHEET 1 (2011), available at
http://innovations.cms.gov/Files/fact-sheet/Pioneer-ACO-General-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
103
See id. at 4.
104
See id.
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B. ACOs: The Case for Optimism
Proponents of the ACO model contend that ACOs are wellpositioned to achieve what the current system has largely failed to
doreduce wasteful care and the cost of treating chronically ill
patients without compromising quality. First, the financial incentives
under the ACO model encourage ACOs to find ways to care for their
patients while both using fewer resources and providing high quality
care. Eliminating wasteful care and better managing the care
provided to those with chronic illness will be important components
105
of an ACO’s efforts to achieve this goal. Second, as large, clinically
and financially integrated organizations, ACOs have the resources
and capacity to implement these strategies.
Tying an ACO’s participating providers’ reimbursements to the
overall cost of care they provide to patients uncouples providers’
incomes, either in whole or in part, from the volume and intensity of
106
services they provide.
As explained above, fee-for-service
encourages a business model where providers generate higher
incomes by increasing the volume and intensity of services they
107
provide.
In contrast, the opportunity for shared savings or
capitated payments under the ACO model ties ACO providers’
incomes to the total resources used to treat their patient population.
This shift therefore requires a new business model, as ACOs must
identify ways in which to care for their patients using fewer
108
resources.
The elimination of wasteful care will be an essential part of an
ACO’s efforts to provide cost-effective patient care. To generate
shared savings or higher margins under capitation, ACOs will be
motivated to reduce duplicative tests, unsafe procedures, and care

105

See infra notes 109111 and accompanying text.
See Fisher, supra note 5, at 221 (“With accountability for overall costs and
quality, providers’ incomes can begin to be decoupled from the volume and intensity
of services they provide.”).
107
See supra Part II.C. For example, hospitals seeking to expand their profits
frequently do so by (1) expanding their capacity, particularly in high-margin services
such as interventional cardiology and intensive care, and (2) recruiting additional
procedure-oriented specialists. See WENNBERG, supra note 5, at 15 (discussing
hospitals’ financial incentives to expand their capacity). The ability of physicians to
drive demand for these services by increasing the number of patients referred for
such care helps ensure that a hospital’s expanded capacity will be utilized. See
generally id. (discussing the dynamics of supply-driven demand).
108
See Boland, supra note 14, at 16 (“Delivery systems such as ACOs will be given
incentives to implement more cost-effective patient care models . . . .”).
106
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lacking scientific support or sufficient value. The ACO model also
rewards the more judicious use of high-cost technologies, inpatient
care, and specialists, thereby encouraging greater reliance on less
intensive medical care, lower-cost treatment settings, and primary
110
care.
The economic incentives under the ACO model also will
foster the adoption of protocols that reduce the risk of medical errors
111
or complications.
The financial incentives under the ACO model also should spur
ACOs to re-orient treatment of chronic conditions away from treating
acute episodes of illness toward better prevention and patient
management, as doing so may reduce emergency room visits, hospital
admissions, and ancillary services associated with preventable
112
complications.
Whereas under fee-for-service providers generally
only focus on the care provided to patients within their four walls,
holding ACOs accountable for all care provided to a patient gives
ACOs strong incentives to coordinate the care provided to patients
113
across all care settings.
For example, ACOs would have the
financial incentive to better manage care transitions for chronically ill
patients, ensuring that all of the patient’s providers and other caregivers have needed information and provide appropriate follow-up
114
care. In addition, ACOs may devote more resources to monitoring
patients with chronic conditions and intervening earlier when
109

See Newman, supra note 4, at 11 (stating that ACOs can generate shared
savings by reducing unnecessary or duplicative services).
110
See Mulvany, supra note 90, at 48 (explaining that the economic incentives of
the ACO model rewards providers for using high-cost technologies more judiciously;
see Newman, supra note 4, at 11 (stating that ACOs will seek to promote lower-cost
treatment options).
111
See Berwick, supra note 9, at 765 (stating that organizations that much reduce
per capita costs would seek to eliminate waste, including errors); see also Fisher, supra
note 5, at 221 (explaining that under the ACO model, “[i]nnovations that improve
quality while reducing overall utilization (and costs) can be rewarded or at least not
penalized”).
112
See Boland, supra note 14, at 13 (“Under new payment schemes [that hold
providers accountable for the cost of care], it will be an economic necessity to avoid
preventable admissions, readmissions, complications, ancillary services, and
emergency room visits.”).
113
See Newman, supra note 4, at 9 (stating that to generate shared savings, ACOs
will improve coordination of care).
114
See MICHAEL TRISOLINI ET AL., THE MEDICARE PHYSICIAN GROUP PRACTICE
DEMONSTRATION: LESSONS LEARNED ON IMPROVING QUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN HEALTH
CARE ix (2008) (commenting that the Medicare demonstration that served as a
model for the Shared Savings Program gave participating organizations a financial
incentive to better manage the many care transitions required for treatment of
chronic diseases).
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patients show the first signs of deterioration.
An ACO also likely
would take steps to promote greater compliance with recommended
clinical guidelines in order to improve the quality of care provided to
116
those with chronic conditions and limit preventable complications.
ACOs seeking cost-saving measures also may be slower to expand
their capacity through the acquisition of new technology, increasing
117
the supply of hospital beds, and employing additional specialists.
This in turn may reduce the frequency of care provided to ACO
patients, as studies have found that the supply of these medical
resources creates its own demand. For example, Wennberg and his
colleagues at the Dartmouth Atlas Project have documented a strong
positive association between rates of diagnostic testing and imaging
118
exams and the supply of equipment needed to perform these tests.
Similarly, the Dartmouth Atlas Project found a positive correlation
between (1) hospitalization rates for most medical (non-surgical)
conditions and the per capita supply of staffed hospital beds, and (2)
119
admission rates to intensive care units and the supply of ICU beds.
Regions with a higher number of physicians per capita, particularly
those specialists treating chronic illnesses, also showed higher
120
physician visit rates.
Moreover, as noted above, the Dartmouth
Atlas Project found that regions providing more care did not achieve

115

See Berwick, supra note 9, at 764 (explaining that an integrator such as an ACO
would assign more value and many more resources to the monitoring and
interception of early signs of deterioration among patients with chronic heart
failure).
116
See Newman, supra note 4, at 11 (stating that financial incentives encourage
ACOs to develop or adopt existing care protocols to improve management of
diseases, increase preventive services, and encourage early diagnosis).
117
ACOs may limit their capacity in an effort to better match supply to the
patient population’s needs. In addition, they may hesitate to acquire new
technologies or make capital investments absent clear evidence that such investments
sufficiently improve care so as to justify their costs. See Berwick, supra note 9, at 765
(stating that an “integrator” such as an ACO would view new technologies and capital
investment with skepticism, and would better match supply to underlying needs).
118
See WENNBERG, supra note 5, at 10 (discussing the association between rates of
diagnostic testing and imaging exams and the supply of equipment).
119
See id. (discussing the correlation between supply of hospital beds and ICU
beds and rates of hospitalization and ICU admissions).
120
Id. (discussing the relationship between the supply of physicians and physician
visits). Although a possible explanation for the positive relationship between supply
and utilization may be that regions with sicker patients acquire more medical
resources because their patients require more care, researchers at the Dartmouth
Atlas Project also found that the prevalence and severity of illness accounts for
remarkably little of the variation in utilization rates across regions. See id. at 9.
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121

better patient outcomes at the population level. To the extent then
that an ACO limits its capacity, doing so likely would reduce its
provision of “supply-sensitive” care without necessarily affecting the
quality of care at the population level.
In addition to having the motivation to lower costs through the
elimination of waste and better patient management, proponents
contend that ACOs also have the resources and capacity to do so. As
large, clinically and financially integrated organizations, ACOs have
several advantages over the current, fragmented system of care that is
largely populated by small group practices. First, ACOs can address
the problems of fragmentation by bringing within one organization
the various physicians, other health professionals, and institutional
122
providers needed to treat patients with chronic conditions.
In
doing so, the ACO can improve coordination among the various
providers treating a patient and better implement initiatives that
require cooperation among multiple providers operating in different
123
treatment settings.
Second, ACOs are better positioned to implement electronic
health records given their deeper financial resources and economies
124
of scale.
As discussed previously, electronic health records are
instrumental to providers’ efforts to reduce waste and provide better
care to chronically ill patients. By facilitating the sharing of patient
information among an ACO’s participating providers, electronic
health records promote better coordination among the multiple
providers treating a chronically ill patient.
This sharing of
information also reduces the need for duplicative tests and
125
procedures.
In addition, use of electronic health records can
promote greater compliance among ACO physicians with evidencebased guidelines, thereby reducing the amount of unnecessary or
inappropriate care and promoting more effective care for chronically
121

See supra notes 2224 and accompanying notes.
See Devers, supra note 88, at 721 (“ACOs offer the promise of decreasing
fragmentation of healthcare delivery by bringing under one virtual roof the various
medical specialists and other health professionals and institutions that need to
coordinate care for the growing number of patients with multiple chronic
conditions.”).
123
See Boland, supra note 14, at 16 (commenting that preventing avoidable events
requires that “measures and methodologies be implemented across all departments
and services”).
124
See Shortell & Casalino, supra note 81, at 95 (“Small practices generally have
less capacity to implement electronic medical records . . . .”).
125
See Boland, supra note 14, at 19 (noting that system-wide electronic medical
records reduce duplicative services).
122
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ill patients.
Third, ACOs, with their electronic health records, larger patient
populations, and financial resources, can generate the statistically
reliable data needed to support efforts to improve efficiency and
127
quality.
Retrospective analysis of patient data can reveal areas
where significant gaps exist between actual practice and known best
128
practices, gaps the ACO can then address through staff training or
the development of patient care protocols. Analysis of patient
outcomes also may identify certain practices that either increase or
reduce the risk of complications requiring costly care. For example,
Intermountain Health Care, one of the model organizations for
ACOs, discovered during its review of patient data that the risk of
wound infections was much lower when patients were administered
prophylactic antibiotics two hours before surgery. Intermountain
Health Care then developed clinical protocols based on these
findings that reduced its rate of post-surgical infections by fifty
129
percent.
Analysis of patient data also can help ACOs identify the
high-risk, high-cost patient populations most likely to benefit from
130
better patient management.
Finally, ACOs are more likely than small physician groups to
have experienced administrators that can promote the elimination of
wasteful care and better patient management. For example, ACO
administrators can promote the effective utilization of health
information technology, oversee the development of clinical
pathways, and coordinate the implementation of cost-effective patient
126

See Richard Hillestad et al., Can Electronic Medical Record Systems Transform
Health Care? Potential Health Benefits, Savings, and Costs, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1103, 1110
(2005) (stating that electronic medical record systems can promote integration of
evidence-based recommendations for preventive care and management of
chronically ill patients); Nir Menachemi & Robert G. Brooks, Reviewing the Benefits
and Costs of Electronic Health Records and Associated Patient Safety Technologies, 30 HEALTH
MED. SYSTEMS 159, 165 (2006) (stating that clinical decision-making systems can
improve diagnostic and treatment regimen decision-making by linking to evidencebased practice guidelines).
127
See Stephen M. Shortell & Lawrence P. Casalino, Health Care Reform Requires
Accountable Care Systems, 300 JAMA 95, 95 (2008) (“Small practices generally . . . are
less able to provide statistically reliable and valid data on quality and efficiency
measures.”).
128
See Boland, supra note 14, at 16 (explaining the potential for retrospective
analytical tools to identify medical events and the rate of those events, with practices
then compared to best-practices databases).
129
See Carpenter, supra note 6, at 135 (discussing Intermountain Health Care’s
continuous quality improvement projects).
130
See Boland, supra note 14, at 16 (stating that accountable care organizations
can use upfront analytics to identify, at-risk, high-cost populations).
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care models.
ACO management also can monitor the practice
patterns of individual physicians and other providers, taking action
132
against those who fail to adhere to organizational objectives.
Finally, ACO administrators can engage in careful, prospective
resource planning, guarding against excess capacity and ensuring
133
that an ACO’s resources match the needs of its patient population.
IV. ACOS AND THE COST-QUALITY TRADE-OFF
ACOs’ potential to eliminate wasteful care and better manage
patient care offers hope that ACOs can successfully contain costs
without adversely impacting, and perhaps even improving, the quality
of care. And yet we should view with skepticism the promise that
ACOs can painlessly contain costs. First, eliminating much of the
care considered “wasteful” involves eliminating care that will prove
beneficial to some patients. Second, the potential cost savings from
better management of patients with chronic conditions may be lower
than ACO proponents contend. Third, long-term inflationary
pressures from advances in medical technology will require ACOs to
continuously find new ways of lowering health care costs savings, but
doing so without sacrificing quality will prove difficult. Finally, even if
in theory ACOs could successfully reduce costs without
compromising the quality of care, in practice some ACOs may stint
on the care they provide patients given their financial incentives to
do so.
131

See James & Savitz, How Intermountain Trimmed Health Care Costs Through Robust
Quality Improvement Efforts, 30:6 HEALTH AFF. 1185, 1185, 1187 (2011) (explaining that
Intermountain Health Care improved the quality of clinical care while lowering costs
by creating “an administrative structure that uses its robust clinical information to
oversee the performance of care delivery and to drive positive change,” and that its
leaders demanded a strategic plan that included creating information systems for
clinical and financial management and a management structure to oversee the
delivery of clinical care).
132
See Gregory Pelnar & Gretchen Weiss, Rule of Reason Analysis for Accountable
Care Organizations, 11 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 6 (2011) (noting that ACOs “may
monitor the contributions of their physicians to achieving savings and high quality
scores”). For example, if management identifies a physician who fails to adhere to
clinical protocols, does not coordinate effectively with other providers, or
consistently provides higher cost care, they may elect to educate the physician in
areas where he or she is deficient, reduce the physician’s bonus, or terminate the
physician’s contract with the ACO. See id. (stating that ACOs may reward high
performing physicians with higher compensation and threaten lower performers
with termination).
133
See Devers, supra note 88, at 12 (stating that one of the essential
characteristics of an ACO is the capability of prospectively planning budgets and
resource needs).
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A. The Waste Hypothesis—Revisited
As discussed in Part II.A, many contend that a significant portion
of the care provided by the United States healthcare system is
“wasteful,” “ineffective,” “unnecessary,” and “inappropriate.” Such
terminology suggests that eliminating wasteful care need not result in
patients being denied potentially beneficial care.
Indeed,
eliminating care that is duplicative, wasteful, or unsafe may prove a
painless approach to reducing costs. But much of the care
considered “wasteful” falls under a different category of wastecare
134
of uncertain or insufficient clinical effectiveness.
For the reasons
discussed below, curbing the provision of such care by ACOs
inevitably involves eliminating care that does some good.
For many medical treatments, there exists insufficient data
135
concerning the treatment’s clinical effectiveness, as evaluating a
134

See Ari Hoffman & Steven Pearson, ‘Marginal Medicine’: Targeting Comparative
Effectiveness Research to Reduce Waste, 28 HEALTH AFF. w710, w711 (2009) (noting that
the most likely source of potentially wasteful care is marginal medicine, that is, care
lacking adequate evidence of clinical benefit, and care whose costs exceed its
marginal benefits); Henry Aaron, Waste, We Know You are Out There, 359 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1865, 1866 (2008) (stating that “most” of the care labeled as waste is not useless
care but provides some benefit).
135
See Jan Blustein & Theodore Marmor, Cutting Waste by Making Rules: Promises,
Pitfalls, and Realistic Prospects, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 155556 (1992). Variations in
medical care are greatest when uncertainty exists regarding the clinical benefits of
alternative treatments. See Opportunities to Increase Efficiency in Health Care: Health
Reform Summit of the Committee on Finance (2008) (statement of Peter Orszag, Director,
Cong. Budget Office) (“Variations in health care are often most dramatic when there
is uncertainty about what kind of treatment to administer.”). On the other hand,
when the clinical evidence clearly supports a particular course of treatment, studies
have found little variation across providers. See WENNBERG, supra note 5, at 14
(“[W]here clinical evidence is strong, the diagnosis is certain, and when doctors
agree on the course of treatment, there is remarkably little variation from region to
region.”). To address weaknesses in the clinical science, many advocate greater
research of patient outcomes and the development of evidence-based clinical
guidelines. See WENNBERG, supra note 5, at 18 (“Many physicians and policymakers
will argue that what is needed are evidence-based clinical guidelines . . . .”). Indeed,
the Affordable Care Act establishes the Center for Quality Improvement and Patient
Safety, a new center charged with developing and disseminating best practice
guidelines. H.R. 3590, §§ 3013, 10303 (2010). While these efforts to promote more
evidence-based medicine are certainly worthwhile, substantial uncertainty in
medicine will remain, as testing the effectiveness of diagnostic tests or therapies is
often extremely expensive and sometimes raises serious ethical issues. See Blustein,
supra note 135, at 1549 (describing some of the problems with clinical trials). While
epidemiological studies and other methods can yield helpful information, they too
raise challenges for the physicians who must interpret them. See id. (describing
alternatives to controlled clinical trials as useful but imperfect). In addition, few
studies track a treatment’s long-term impact on a patient’s health. See Barbara Evans,
Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the
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treatment’s clinical efficacy often takes years, particularly with regards
136
to its long-term impact on patients’ health. Some care lacking clear
evidence establishing clinical efficacy certainly would prove wasteful,
either because it provides no clinical benefit or its benefits are no
greater than lower-cost alternatives. But, for many of these so-called
“wasteful” treatments, time will clearly establish the treatment’s
137
clinical benefit for particular patients. To the extent that an ACO
limits the provision of a treatment until its effectiveness is verified,
patients denied the treatment in the interim would be denied
potentially beneficial care.
Similarly, ACO providers who elect not to provide their patients
care that on average may be of little to no value nevertheless may
adversely impact the quality of care provided to some patients. Even
when we possess information on a treatment’s overall clinical
effectiveness, statistical projections based on large population
averages may hide significant variation among patients. Because
patient conditions and characteristics can vary, a given intervention
138
may affect patients differently.
Consequently, a treatment that on
average has little clinical effectiveness, and thus appears “wasteful,” in
139
For
fact may be very effective for a small group of patients.
example, while the drug clopidogrel (Plavix) generally has no benefit
over aspirin in preventing myocardial infarction and stroke, for
approximately one in every two hundred patients the drug in fact
140
prevents myocardial infarction and stroke.
Therefore,
a
treatment’s potential clinical benefits for an individual patient often
remain uncertain, with some care that, on average, is of no, or merely
141
marginal, benefit potentially benefitting some patients.
Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 44647 (2010) (noting that few clinical
trials are of sufficient duration to allow for the detection of an intervention’s longterm effects on health). So although more research on patient outcomes will
improve the scientific basis for medical decisions, the limits of science and constant
medical innovation mean much uncertainty will remain.
136
See Evans, supra note 135.
137
See Hoffman & Pearson, supra note 134, at w712 (stating that care considered
wasteful because there remains uncertainty regarding its clinical effectiveness “may
turn out to be highly effective, at least for some patients”).
138
See Aaron, supra note 134, at 1866 (“A given intervention typically affects
individual patients differently”).
139
See Jost, supra note 15, at 15 (stating that statistical projections based on large
populations may suggest that a particular treatment is of marginal value, when in fact
it may be of value for particular patients).
140
See Hoffman & Person, supra note 134, at w714 (discussing the potential
benefits of clopidogrel).
141
See Jost, supra note 15, at 15 (“Given the infinite variability of patients and
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Finally, many treatments are considered wasteful not because
they provide no clinical benefit, but because their benefits may be
142
insufficient when compared to the treatment’s cost. Eliminating
care on cost-benefit grounds would, by definition, involve denying
143
care that is of potential benefit to patients.
For example,
chemotherapy for advanced cancer may only add a few weeks of life
144
at a cost of tens of thousands of dollars.
While many would
consider the cost of such treatment as outweighing its potential
benefit, few would claim that extending a patient’s life by a few weeks
is of no benefit. Thus, while limiting care of uncertain or insufficient
clinical value may be justified on utilitarian grounds, their
elimination certainly would not be “painless”; rather, it necessarily
145
includes eliminating care that would be effective for some patients.
B. Better Management of Patients with Chronic ConditionsRevisited
As discussed above in Part III.B, supporters of ACOs contend
that ACOs can achieve substantial savings while improving patient
outcomes not only through the elimination of inefficient care, but
also through better management of chronically ill patients.
Specifically, proponents contend that through enhanced screening
146
and monitoring, improved patient education, better coordination
of care, and greater adherence to best medical practices, ACOs will
conditions, it is often quite difficult to know with any precision how useful any test or
procedure will be ex ante.”). See also Mashaw, supra note 51, at 465 (stating that the
task of defining “waste” and “abuse” in medicine is greatly complicated by the use of
“averages to make judgments about individual cases”).
142
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
143
See Blustein, supra note 135, at 156061 (“When cutting waste on economic
grounds, we inevitably eliminate some services that do some good.”); Aaron, supra
note 134, at 1866 (“Even those interventions deemed excessively costly actually help
some patients.”).
144
See Hoffman and Pearson, supra note 134, at w713 (discussing the costeffectiveness of chemotherapy for advanced cancer).
145
See Blustein, supra note 135, at 1564 (“[B]ecause the spectrum of care includes
care that is effective, . . . we must watch out for immoderate promises about painless
‘waste cutting.’”).
146
See supra notes 4547 and accompanying text (discussing examples of medical
interventions that both improved quality while lowering costs). See also S.H. Woolf, A
Closer Look at the Economic Argument for Disease Prevention, 301 JAMA 536, 536 (2009)
(stating that childhood immunizations, smoking cessation counseling, and aspirin
prophylaxis among patients at increased risk for cardiovascular disease yield net cost
savings); L.B. Russell, Preventing Chronic Disease: An Important Investment, But Don’t
Count on Costs Savings, 28 HEALTH AFF. 42, 44 (2009) (explaining that vaccination
against pneumococcal pneumonia reduces spending for adults ages 5064 with
certain chronic conditions).
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reduce the complications associated with chronic conditions. This in
turn will yield cost savings by decreasing the use of acute care
services. Unfortunately, sweeping statements about the cost-saving
potential of improved care for chronically ill patients may be
overreaching.
Although some improvements in the care provided to
chronically ill patients can both improve patient outcomes while
containing costs, a review of the health economics literature suggests
that most do not. Studies of both preventive measures and disease
147
management programs have repeatedly found that most fail to
produce net cost savings, and in some cases the programs even
148
increase health care spending.
One primary reason for these
findings is the high costs of the programs themselves. While better
chronic care can reduce the frequency of costly acute treatments for
complications, these cost savings may not make up the costs
associated with additional physician visits and monitoring, increased
149
use of medications, and patient counseling. Similarly, while earlier
detection of a disease may prevent having to treat the disease later in
a more serious and costly form, the screening costs for healthy people
often far outweigh any savings from earlier treatment of those with
147

The term disease management refers to a range of activities intended to
address shortcomings in current medical treatment.
Specifically, disease
management programs aim to help patients better manage their chronic conditions,
improve the monitoring of patients’ symptoms and treatment plans, promote closer
adherence to evidence-based guidelines, and better coordinate the care provided to
patients seeing multiple providers. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 42, at 2
(explaining what disease management is).
148
See Joshua Cohen et al., Does Preventive Care Save Money? Health Economics and
the Presidential Candidates, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 661, 662 (2008) (reviewing numerous
studies of preventive measures and concluding that most do not save money);
Russell, supra note 146, at 42 (arguing that prevention usually increases medical
spending); Bobby Milstein et al., Analyzing National Health Reform Strategies with a
Dynamic Simulation Model, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 811, 812 (2010) (concluding that
better preventive and chronic care do not typically reduce total health care costs);
Soeren Mattke et al., Evidence for the Effect of Disease Management: Is $1 Billion a Year a
Good Investment?, 13 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 670, 670 (2007) (reviewing the literature
on disease management and concluding that there is little evidence disease
management leads to a net reduction of direct medical costs); Luck, supra note 35, at
400 (stating that the published literature on disease management does not provide
evidence that improved care for patients with complex conditions produce cost
savings); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 42, at 1 (concluding that the evidence of
cost savings from disease management is quite limited).
149
See Milstein et al., supra note 148, at 812 (stating that good preventive and
chronic care typically does not reduce total health care costs even though it can
reduce the frequency of more costly acute complications and urgent hospital visits, as
it requires additional visits and medications).
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150

the disease.
The incentive payments typically offered to providers
to better manage care also may outweigh any reduction in
151
utilization.
Ironically, better care also can result in higher utilization rates.
For example, more frequent screenings may increase costs by
resulting in the unnecessary treatment of “false positives,” with some
152
of those treatments leading to costly complications and side-effects.
In addition, improved care sometimes only slows down a disease’s
progression, thus simply delaying, but not avoiding, the cost of
153
treating complications.
Moreover, because better care often
extends the life of persons with chronic conditions, improved patient
management may result in chronically ill patients consuming more
care over time, particularly as many will develop additional chronic
154
conditions as they age.
Clearly, medical interventions that fail to produce net savings
still may be worthwhile. Improved care for those with chronic
conditions can increase patients’ length and quality of life at a
reasonable costthat is, they are cost-effective and thus a good use of
150

See Ron Goetzel, Do Prevention Or Treatment Services Save Money? The Wrong
Debate, 28 HEALTH AFF. 37, 37 (2009) (“[S]creening costs for healthy people far
outweigh treatment costs for the few who develop the disease.”); Cohen, supra note
148, at 661 (“[S]creening costs will exceed savings from avoided treatment in cases in
which only a very small fraction of the population would have become ill in the
absence of preventive measures.”); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LESSONS FROM MEDICARE’S
DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS ON DISEASE MANAGEMENT, CARE COORDINATION, AND VALUEBASED PAYMENT 12 (2012) (stating that evaluations of Medicare programs involving
disease management and care coordination found that in nearly every program,
“spending was either unchanged or increased relative to the spending that would
have occurred in the absence of the program”).
151
For example, a study of Medicare disease management and care coordination
programs by the Congressional Budget Office found that programs using care
managers integrated into physicians’ offices did not yield sufficient savings in regular
Medicare expenditures to off-set the additional fees paid to program participants for
enhanced care coordination. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 150, at 4
(discussing results from Medicare demonstration programs using care managers).
152
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 42, at 6. For example, when Carol Smith, a
former smoker, got a CT scan for the purpose of detecting early lung cancer,
physicians found a lesion in her lung. A subsequent surgical biopsy revealed that the
lesion was benign, but complications from the surgery left her in intensive care for
two weeks and without full use of her left arm. See Petersen, supra note 30.
153
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 42, at 14 (noting that disease
management programs might merely change the timing of significant expenditures
by postponing, rather than preventing, the need for acute treatment).
154
See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH CARE COSTS: A PRIMER 25 (2012) (stating
that one reason for growing health care costs is developments in medicine and
medical technology that enable people to live longer, often with chronic conditions
that require ongoing medical care).
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155

society’s resources.
Nevertheless, we should view with skepticism
claims that ACOs can painlessly lower health care costs simply by
better managing the care provided to their chronically ill patients.
C. The Long-Term Challenge of Technology-Driven Inflation
As discussed in Part III, ACOs clearly have the potential to lower
costs without harming quality by eliminating obviously wasteful
practices and adopting patient management techniques known to
reduce costs. The inflationary effect of advances in medical
technology, however, will require ACOs to continuously find new
ways of lowering costs. For the reasons discussed below, in the long
term ACOs likely will be unable to do so without compromising the
quality of care they provide to their patients.
156
Advances in medical technology are the major contributor to
157
rising health care costs, accounting for one-half to two-thirds of
155

See Fireman, supra note 11, at 73 (stating that most of the medical
interventions recommended for treatment of patients with chronic conditions are
cost-effective, in that “[t]hey increase the length and quality of life at a cost that is
reasonable – a good value compared with other services . . . .”); Cohen et al., supra
note 148, at 662 (“Some preventive measures . . . may still be worthwhile because
they confer substantial health benefits relative to their cost.”); Milstein, supra note
79, at 812 (“[G]ood preventive and chronic care is typically cost-effective (improving
health at reasonable cost and thus arguably worth doing) . . . .”).
156
Technology advances include innovations and improvements in medical
equipment, pharmaceuticals, and procedures. See Carpenter, supra note 6, at 133
(defining medical technology advances).
157
See Jessica Mantel, Setting National Coverage Standards for Health Plans Under
Healthcare Reform, 58 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 221, 240 (2010) (“By far the largest factor
contributing to increasing healthcare costs is advances in medical technology.”).
While some new technologies decrease costs, most increase health care expenditures.
See Carpenter, supra note 6, at 133 (“While some technologies are cost decreasing,
the majority in health care are cost increasing.”). Because the price for new medical
technologies generally is quite high, price inflation for healthcare typically exceeds
the inflation rate for other goods and services. See Mantel, supra, at 240. In addition,
new technologies that identify additional patients with a condition increase the
population receiving care, which in turn increases health expenditures. See
Carpenter, supra note 6, at 133 (“Some new technologies identify and expand the
population in need of care without necessarily offering new or better ways to treat
the conditions. Similarly, new technologies that allow treatment of previously
untreatable conditions often raise health expenditures by increasing the number of
patients receiving treatment. See Mantel, supra at 240 (“By increasing the number of
health conditions for which there exist potentially beneficial treatments, advances in
medical technology have caused significant increases in aggregate utilization of
healthcare services.”); see Mathias Goyen & Jorg F. Debatin, Healthcare Costs for New
Technologies, 36 (Suppl.) EUR. J. NUCL. MED. MOL. IMAGING, S139, S140 (2008) (stating
that new technologies affect health care costs by developing treatments for previously
untreatable conditions). New technologies that merely ameliorate symptoms but do
not cure or slow-down a disease also result in higher expenditures. See Carpenter,
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158

annual medical spending increases.
With new breakthroughs in
biomedical and genetics research occurring with greater frequency,
future advances in technology likely will place even greater pressure
159
on costs.
Consequently, any initial savings achieved by ACOs
eventually would be overcome by rising costs attributable to medical
160
advances. If in the long-term ACOs are to successfully rein in rising
health care costs, they must continuously find new ways to achieve
cost savings.
Unfortunately, there are reasons to doubt ACOs’ long-term
potential to achieve new cost savings without sacrificing the quality of
care provided to patients. As discussed in Part III.A, ACOs could
painlessly lower costs by eliminating medical interventions shown to
be unsafe, clinically ineffective, duplicative, or more costly than
comparable alternatives. Once ACOs exploit this “low hanging fruit,”
however, further reductions in so-called wasteful care would involve
denying patients care of uncertain or insufficient clinical value. As
previously discussed, eliminating care of uncertain or insufficient
clinical value inevitably involves denying some patients potentially
161
beneficial care.
supra note 6, at 133 (“Some of our newest biotechnologies are not even aimed at
cure but merely amelioration of symptoms. This is likely to result in higher
expenditures because treatment will extend over a longer period of time without
affecting a cure.”).
158
See Goyen & Debatin, supra note 157, at 36 (“Most experts believe that medical
technology advances account for half to two-thirds of annual spending increases.”).
159
See Gregg Bloche, Beyond the “R Word”? Medicine’s New Frugality, 366 NEW ENG.
J. OF MED. 1951, 1952 (2012) (explaining that even if we could eliminate all waste,
medical costs will eventually rise again given the high rate of medical inflation, and
therefore in the long-term we must “start saying no to some beneficial care”); Henry
J. Aaron, The Unsurprising Surprise of Renewed Health Care Cost Inflation, 31 HEALTH
AFF.,
w85
(Jan.
23,
2002),
available
at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2002/02/23/hlthaff.w2.85.full.pdf+
html (stating that the forces driving up costs over the long haul are intensifying given
that the staggering fecundity of biomedical research is increasing); see also David S.
Hilzenrath, What’s Left to Squeeze? Managed-Care Firms Find Health Costs Rising – and
Cuts Harder to Come By, WASHINGTON POST, July 6, 1997, at H01 (referencing the
opinion of Robert J. Rubin, former president of the Lewin Group, who stated that
controlling costs may be harder to do in the future when research in genetics and
biotechnology produce important breakthroughs). For example, new cancer
therapies can cost in the $100,000 range. See Lola Butcher, Oncology Community
Concerned About CMS ACO Proposal, ONCOLOGY TIMES 40 (2011) (noting the high cost
of two new cancer therapies, Sipuleucel-T (Provenge) at $90,000 for a three-month
course of treatment and ipilmumab (Yervoy) at $120,000 for a four-dose regimen).
160
See Blustein, supra note 135, at 1566 (arguing that savings achieved from a onetime reduction in expenditures would inevitable be dwarfed by rising costs
attributable to the medical care inflation).
161
See supra Part IV.A.
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Similarly, mature ACOs that have already successfully lowered
costs through improved treatment of patients with chronic conditions
may find generating further savings a significant challenge. As two
commentators have noted, “[t]he greatest amount of quality
improvement engendered by disease management occurs when
additional care is provided to patients who have not been receiving
162
available beneficial care.”
When an organization successfully
improves its patients’ health, however, further improvements in
health status may be difficult to achieve. For example, an ACO that
significantly reduces the readmission rate for its patients hospitalized
for congestive heart failure may have little room for improvement,
with further reductions in the readmission rate proving elusive.
Mature ACOs also may find that any marginal improvement in the
health of its chronically ill patients fails to yield net cost savings, as
any savings generated from fewer hospital admissions and other
reductions in acute care frequently will be outweighed by the cost of
163
the disease management program itself.
These challenges may
explain why a study of new chronic disease management techniques
adopted by Kaiser Permanente found that the interventions failed to
yield absolute cost savingsas a mature integrated delivery system,
Kaiser Permanente had already harvested the benefits of good patient
management, including reductions in hospital admissions and short
164
average length-of-stays.
So although ACOs’ initial efforts to eliminate wasteful care and
better manage chronically ill patients may produce cost savings
without adversely impacting the quality of care, for mature ACOs,
finding further cost savings without compromising quality may prove
165
extraordinarily difficult. ACOs thus do not offer a permanent
162

Francis Crosson & Philip Madvig, Does Population Management of Chronic Disease
Lead to Lower Costs of Care?, 23 HEALTH AFF. 76, 78 (2004).
163
To yield net savings, a disease management program must significantly reduce
hospital admissions rates and other care associated with treating preventable
complications. Opportunities for such savings are far greater when a disease
management program targets a sicker population. See Ariel Linden & Julia AdlerMilstein, Medicare Disease Management in Policy Context, 29 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 1, 3–
4 (2008) (explaining that to break even a disease management program must reduce
hospital admissions rates, and that it is easier to do so with a sicker population
because disease programs targeting sicker populations are likely to reduce the
greatest percentage of hospitalizations).
164
See Crosson & Madvig, supra note 162, at 7778 (discussing the results of
Fireman and colleagues’ study on Kaiser Permanente’s disease management
program over the period 1996–2002).
165
See id. at 78 (“[I]ncremental disease management interventions, beyond those
already achieved by mature [Integrated Delivery Systems], will prove to be elusive in
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solution to rising health care costs if we also insist that they not
sacrifice quality.
D. ACOs and the Risk of Under-treatment
Even if in theory ACOs could successfully contain costs while
improving the quality of care, in practice some ACOs may stint on the
care they provide patients. First, under the ACO payment model,
ACOs have a financial incentive to withhold medically appropriate
care from their patients in order to increase their shared savings or
profit margins. Second, an ACO seeking to limit costs may fail to
ensure that it has sufficient resources at the organizational level to
meet the full range of needs among its patient population. Although
tying an ACO’s payment to its performance on various quality
measures provides some protection against this risk of undertreatment, weaknesses in quality measures mean some patients will
remain vulnerable.
Under the ACO payment models, providers profit by minimizing
the cost of care provided to patients. A primary means by which
ACOs will limit costs is through their gatekeeping rolethat is,
determining which services should be provided to individual patients.
In this gatekeeping role, ACOs may limit patient care by making
fewer referrals to specialists, ordering fewer tests, and eliminating
high-tech, expensive treatments. To the extent that there is much fat
in the current system of care, limiting such care may not necessarily
166
harm the quality of care. There is the very real risk, however, that
some ACO providers may go beyond trimming fat and deny or delay
providing their patients appropriate medical interventions in order
167
to maximize their shared savings or profit margins.
The ACO
the end for payers.”); SIEMENS, NAVIGATING THE PERFECT STORM: HEALTHCARE IN 2010
8 (2010), available at http://www.medical.siemens.com/siemens/en_US
/gg_hs_FBAs/files/IT_Solutions_And_Consulting/New_2009/ARRA/2010-1110_NavigatingthePerfectStorm11-10_A9133-101897-C1-4A00.pdf (noting that one
health care executive at a large health care system had found cutting costs to be
“getting harder,” as the system had already “picked most of the low-hanging fruit in
terms of cost containment”).
166
See supra Part I.A.
167
See Stephen Ubl, ACOs: Improved Care or Roadblocks to Innovation, HEALTH AFF.
BLOG (Apr. 25, 2011, 1:41 P.M.), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2011/04/25/acosimproved-care-or-roadblocks-to-innovation/ (noting the danger of ACOs stinting on
care); National Health Council’s Comments on CMS-1345-P (2011) (stating that the
financial incentives under the Medicare Shared Savings Program “could lead to
underutilization of new and/or costlier technologies that have the potential to
improve individual patient outcomes”); Pelnar & Weiss, supra note 132 (“[B]ecause
the ACO model financially rewards provider organizations for achieving cost savings,
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model thus poses a real risk of under-treatment, particularly for
patients requiring costly, complex care.
In addition, resource allocation decisions at the organizational
level may result in ACO patients having diminished access to
medically appropriate care. Because ACOs must provide care to their
patients using fewer resources, ACO administrators and professionals
not only must be more judicious in what care they provide to
individual patients, but also must establish spending priorities at the
organizational level. For example, an ACO may decide to lower its
costs by reducing its nursing staff, limiting the number of specialists
in the ACO, eliminating inpatient beds, or delaying the acquisition of
168
new technology.
Although the findings of the Dartmouth group
suggest scaling back on available services may not adversely impact
quality, some ACOs may go beyond trimming excess resources. To
the extent that an ACO fails to maintain adequate resources to meet
its patient population’s needs, its patients will have diminished access
to necessary care.
Recognizing the risk of under-treatment, the ACO model ties an
169
ACO’s payments to its performance on selected quality measures.
For example, ACOs participating in the Medicare Shared Savings
170
Program must report on thirty-three quality measures and perform
it creates an inherent incentive to undertreat and underutilize . . . .”). For example,
oncologists have expressed concern that ACOs will prematurely refer their cancer
patients to a hospice program in lieu of specialty care that may produce better
patient outcomes, but at a higher cost. See Butcher, supra note 159, at 40 (2011)
(discussing oncologists’ concerns about ACOs withholding appropriate care from
cancer patients).
168
See David Mechanic, Cost Containment and the Quality of Medical Care: Rationing
Strategies in an Era of Constrained Resources, 63 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 453, 463
(1985) (stating that setting priorities under constrained budgets may result in the
delay of initiation of a new technology, service or unit, reducing staff, closing beds,
eliminating nonessential services, and constraining other major costs). Cf. PHILIP
BETBEZE, HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA INTELLIGENCE, REFORM’S IMPACT: STAFF AND SERVICE
CUTS
EXPECTED
10
(Dec.
2011),
available
at
http://content.hcpro.com/pdf/content/274037.pdf (reporting that forty-three
percent of respondents to a survey of health industry leaders stated that their facility
will likely cut services as a result of implementation of the Affordable Care Act, and
fifty-five percent stated that they will cut staff).
169
See Pelnar & Weiss, supra note 132, at 6 (stating that one purpose of quality
measures is to prevent ACOs from under-treating patients); Eric C. Schneider et al.,
Payment Reform: Analysis of Models and Performance Measurement Implications, RAND
CORP., 32, 38 (2011) (stating that a key role of performance measures in a global or
share savings payment model is to ensure that quality does not decline and ACOs do
not reduce care inappropriately as ACOs seek to reduce the cost of treating
patients).
170
See 76 FED. REG. 67802, 6788990 (Nov. 2, 2011) (Table I listing thirty-three
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at the thirtieth percentile or better on at least seventy percent of the
quality measures. In addition, ACOs exceeding the minimum
threshold would be eligible for a larger proportion of any savings the
171
ACO generates for the Medicare program.
While holding ACOs
financially accountable for their performance on selected quality
measures certainly affords some protection against ACOs’ stinting on
172
care, for the reasons discussed below, many patients will remain
173
vulnerable.
The performance measures used to assess the quality of care
provided by ACOs likely will be less comprehensive than necessary to
protect against ACOs stinting on care. The initial set of quality
measures under the Medicare Shared Savings Program, for example,
174
focuses on certain conditions and services, leaving important areas
of clinical practice unaddressed, such as treatment for cancer, severe
175
arthritis, or chronic pain.
To be fair, CMS has stated that in the
future it will select additional measures applicable to these and other
176
domains of care. Currently available measures, however, largely
focus on prevention and certain aspects of chronic care, and
developing new measures that address the full range of services and
clinical settings will take time. In the short term, the absence of
quality measures across all domains of care may leave some ACO
patients vulnerable to under-treatment as ACOs strive to lower the
177
cost of care.
performance measures adopted in the final rule).
171
See id. at 67897–98 (finalizing rule that ACOs perform at the thirtieth
percentile or better on at least seventy percent of the quality measures).
172
See Mulvany, supra note 90, at 48 (stating that the ACO payment model
“penalizes providers that stint on care solely to meet financial goals”); see Schneider
et al., supra note 169, at 38 (2011) (stating that the role of performance measures
under the ACO model is “to monitor the quality of care delivered by participants in
the ACO and to ensure that quality does not decline as clinicians seek to reduce the
cost of treating the ACO population”).
173
In an effort to achieve costs below applicable expenditure benchmarks and
boost their performance on quality measures, ACOs also have an incentive to avoid
high-risk patients who are less likely to be healthy and comply with their providers’
orders. See Pelnar & Weiss, supra note 132, at 6 (stating that ACOs may avoid high
risk patients in order to achieve high quality metric scores).
174
The performance measures in the final rule for the shared savings program
include measures addressing diabetes, hypertension, heart disease, and chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). See 76 FED. REG. 67802, 67889–90 (Nov. 2,
2011) (Table I listing thirty-three performance measures adopted in the final rule).
175
See id.
176
See id. at 67886 (stating that CMS will consider additional measures addressing
cancer and other conditions in future rulemaking).
177
See Pelnar & Weiss, supra note 132, at 8 (stating that an ACO performing well
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Even for those domains of care for which CMS selects quality
performance measures, the measures may not adequately guard
against diminished quality. Most of the measures selected by CMS
under the Shared Savings Program are process measures that
evaluate the extent to which a provider delivers a specific clinical
178
service at a specific point in time.
Process measures, however, are
unlikely to provide a complete picture of the quality of care ACOs
provide to their patients. First, because process measures are based
on current treatment norms, process measures cannot be developed
for the many areas of medicine lacking a strong scientific basis or
179
consensus as to best practices. Second, process measures may be a
180
crude measure of the quality of care provided to patients, as the
selected process measures focus on discrete interventions and do not
181
measure all processes of care that impact a patient’s health.
In
addition, process measures simply measure whether a procedure was
performed and do not measure other attributes of care that may be
important indicators of quality, such as a health care professional’s
182
expertise or operator skill.
Finally, process measures fail to
183
measure what ultimately matterspatient health. To the extent the
nexus between the measured process and a patient’s health is weak,
evaluating whether an ACO performed a particular process may tell
us little about whether the ACO’s clinical interventions improved
on reported quality measures may not mean that it has not engaged in restricting or
delaying care in ways not reflected in the quality measures); Butcher, supra note 159,
at 40 (commenting that the absence of quality measures for cancer care may result in
cancer patients being denied new, expensive drugs given ACOs’ financial pressures).
178
Examples of process measures selected by CMS for inclusion in the Shared
Savings Program include screening for fall risk (measure 13), depression screening
(measure 18), colorectal l cancer screening (measure 19), mammography screening
(measure 20), and percentage of adults who had their blood pressure measured
within the preceding 2 years (measure 21). See 76 FED. REG. 67802, 67889–90 (listing
quality measures adopted in final rule).
179
See Marshall Chin & Naoko Muramatsu, What is the Quality of Quality of Medicare
Core Measures?: Rashomon-like Relativism and Real-World Applications, 46:1 PERSPECTIVES
IN BIOLOGY AND MED. 5, 12 (2003) (stating that confusing, limited, or conflicting data
often makes impossible the consensus necessary to develop process measures).
180
See id. at 12 (discussing the limitations of process measures).
181
See id. (noting that process measures capture elements of care but miss
important outcomes).
182
See Jonathan Mant, Process versus Outcomes Indicators in the Assessment of Quality of
Health Care, 13 INT’L J. FOR QUALITY IN HEALTH CARE 475, 478 (2001) (explaining that
that process measures cannot capture important determinants of patient outcomes
such as technical expertise and operator skill).
183
See Douglas L. Wood, Measure Health, Not Care, MINNESOTA MED. 2 (Apr. 2012)
(stating that process measures do not address the health of an individual or
population).

2.MANTEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

10/23/2012 3:56 PM

CAN WE HAVE OUR CAKE AND EAT IT TOO?

1431

184

patient health.
Similarly, the patient experience measures included under the
Medicare Shared Savings Program may fail to reveal problems with
the quality of clinical care provided to ACO patients. Patient surveys
ask patients to report on their satisfaction with their care, their
perceptions of the quality of care, and their perceptions of what
185
specific care they received.
Studies repeatedly have found that
measures of patients’ general satisfaction fail to adequately
discriminate among providers, with less than ten percent of the
variance in patients’ responses attributable to differences in the care
186
provided. While measures of specific patient experience appear to
better discriminate among providers, most of the variance in
responses is due to differences in patients’ perceptions and random
187
error. Problems in the reliability and validity of patient satisfaction
and experience measures reflect the fact that patient reports are
188
subjective and subject to reporting biases.
For example, research
suggests that patient report measures are unreliable after a delay or
more than six weeks and are more prone to error when patients must

184

As explained by one commentator, because process measures reflect current
treatment norms, they are only as good as the clinical evidence underlying those
norms. See Avedis Donabedian, THE DEFINITION OF QUALITY AND APPROACHES TO ITS
ASSESSMENT 119 (1980) (“The major drawback in the use of process for the
assessment of the quality of care is the weakness of the scientific basis for much of
accepted practices.”).
Unfortunately, much uncertainty exists regarding the
effectiveness of various clinical interventions.
See supra notes 13436 and
accompanying text.
185
See Maxwell Drain & Paul Clark, Measuring Experience from the Patient’s
Perspective: Implications for National Initiatives, JHG ONLINE W4–6, W4–6 (2004)
(explaining the different types of information that can be obtained from patient
surveys).
186
See Chris Salisbury et al., Patients’ Experience and Satisfaction in Primary Care:
Secondary Analysis Using Multilevel Modeling, BMJ (Oct. 12, 2010), available at
http://www.bmj.com/content/341/bmj.c5004 (discussing studies showing that
measures of patients’ satisfaction discriminate poorly between practices, doctors, and
hospitals, with random error and differences in patients’ perceptions accounting for
9097%of the variance in patients’ responses).
187
See id. (reporting that 20.2 percent of the variance in wait for appointment
outcome was due to differences between practices, with the remaining 79.1 percent
attributable to differences in individual patients’ perceptions and random error);
Mala Rao et al., Patients’ Own Assessments of Quality of Primary Care Compared with
Objective Records Based Measures of Technical Quality of Care: Cross Sectional Study, BMJ
(June 29, 2006), available at http://www.bmj.com/content/333/7557/19 (finding
low correlation between patients assessments of their care and the evidence-based
measures of clinical outcomes).
188
See Drain & Clark, supra note 185, at W4–7 (“[Patient] evaluations tend to be
subjective, subject to reporting biases, and difficult to interpret . . . .”).
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189

recall multiple instances of care.
Consequently, scores on patient
experience measures may not be reliable indicators of the quality of
care patients receive.
Recognizing these weaknesses in process and patient experience
measures, CMS plans to add additional outcome measures to its
190
selected quality measures. Whereas process measures focus on what
care was actually provided to a patient, outcome measures assess what
we ultimately care aboutthe patient’s health status. That is,
191
outcome measures assess the end result of clinical intervention,
such as morbidity rates, the severity of a patient’s chronic condition,
and hospital re-admission rates. In focusing on patient’s health,
outcome measures better protect patients against poor quality care.
In particular, longitudinal measures of changes in patients’
functional status, morbidity, and quality of life may guard against the
risk of under-treatment, as such patient outcomes depend on the mix
192
of services provided to patients over time.
Outcome measures, however, also are problematic. Assessing
whether an ACO provides high-quality care requires comparing the
health status of an ACO’s patients to the patients of other providers.
Disparities in observed patient outcomes across providers, however,
may be due to chance rather than differences in the quality of care
provided. Consequently, the sample size of the measured data must
be large enough to minimize the possibility that perceived differences
in outcomes result from random variation, rather than differences in
193
the quality of care. Statistical power also depends on the frequency
189

See id. at W4–8–9 (discussing problems with patient reports).
See 76 Fed. Reg. 67802, 67873.
191
See Willis et al., Measuring Quality, 31 AUSTRALIAN HEALTH REV. 276, 278 (2007)
(discussing process and outcome quality measures).
192
See Schneider, supra note 169, at 40 (“Measurement of longitudinal changes in
functional status and quality of life may be the most effective way to assess whether
providers are optimally applying services within the ACO.”).
193
See Mant, supra note 182, at 478 (discussing the need to eliminate random
variation as an explanation for observed differences in patient outcomes). See also
Schneider, supra note 169, at 12 (noting the need to obtain sufficient numbers of
observations to estimate performance with a reasonable degree of confidence). As
one commentator illustrated:
[T]o detect a 30% difference in outcome between two units
performing carotid endarterectomy with 80% power at a significance
level of 5%, with one unit achieving a 7% death and complication rate
and another unit a 10% rate, would require the audit of 1422 carotid
endarectomies in each unit. Given that hospitals in New York State
each performed an average of 50 carotid endarectomies a year in 1995,
such a difference is unlikely to be detected.
190
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with which the measured outcome occurs, with a larger sample size
194
To the extent an
needed to detect small differences in quality.
ACO’s patient population is not large enough to ensure an adequate
sample size, regulators will be unable to detect differences in the
quality of care provided by an ACO and other providers, putting ACO
195
patients at risk of under-treatment.
Measures of patient outcomes also do not necessarily correlate
with the actual quality of care provided to patients, as numerous
196
other factors external to treatment impact a patient’s health. Often
these factors are largely outside the ACO’s control, such as the
patient’s non-compliance with their physician’s instructions, lifestyle
factors, poverty, and the strength of a patient’s social support
197
system. In addition, evaluating clinical outcomes is complicated by
the fact that the health status of patients treated for a particular
condition depends not only on the quality of the care they receive,
but also on whether they suffer other unrelated medical conditions.
For example, the functional status of a stroke patient may be low not
because they receive poor quality care following their stroke, but
because of an unrelated intervening event affecting their health, such
Mant, supra note 182, at 476.
194
See Mant, supra note 182, at 478. For example,
[s]ince the target complication rate in carotid endarectomy is low
(6%), monitoring outcome will only have limited ability to detect
whether an individual surgeon’s true complication rate is greater than
6%. For example, if a surgeon’s ‘true’ complication rate was 8%, one
would need to monitor the outcome of 1200 operations to detect that
this surgeon’s rate was greater than 6% with 80% power at a
significance level of 5%.
Id.
195
Because ACOs generally assume responsibility for a larger patient population
than those cared for by a single hospital or physician group, for many measures an
ACO’s patient population may be sufficiently large to ensure an adequate sample
size. See Schneider, supra note 169, at 35 (“Because the enrolled populations under
the global payment and ACO shared savings program models will tend to be larger
than those of a single hospital, group, or physician, it may be easier to obtain
adequate sample sizes for performance measurement.”). For some measures,
however, this may not prove to be the case.
196
See Pelnar & Weiss, supra note 132, at 9 (“Outcome measures may not reflect
actual quality of care delivered because they are influenced by many external
variables . . . .”). Data on patient outcomes for longer-term courses of treatment are
especially prone to confounding factors given that they involve collecting data over
longer time periods. See Chin & Muramatsu, supra note 179, at 10 (“Longer-term
courses will be more likely to capture ultimate health status, but are prone to
confounding by other intervening events not related to the quality of care.”).
197
See Mant, supra note 182, at 476 (discussing factors other than health care that
are determinants of health).
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198

as a myocardial infarction.
Although adjusting the data for
variation in patient characteristics can reduce the possibility that
observed differences in data are due to factors other than the quality
of care (a process known as risk-adjustment), methodologies for
199
doing so are often inconsistent and produce contradictory results.
For some domains of care, these challenges may render it impossible
to develop statistically valid outcome measures that would detect true
differences in the quality of care.
A final concern regarding outcome measures is that the data
used for measuring patient outcomes often is incomplete, inaccurate,
200
or subject to manipulation by providers.
Assessments of ACOs’
quality of care entail comparing their performance on quality
measures to the performance of other providers. To be a fair
comparison, performance comparisons must take into account
clinical, demographic, and other differences among providers’
patients that may affect patient outcomes (i.e., the performance
201
measures must be risk adjusted).
Accurate comparisons of
providers’ performance, however, require complete data of sufficient
202
clinical detail to allow for sophisticated risk adjustment.
Unfortunately, the needed patient data is often incomplete, lacks
203
sufficient detail, or is inaccurate due to errors in diagnosis coding.
198

See Chin & Muramatsu, supra note 180, at 10 (noting that unrelated
myocardial infarction complicates measurement of a stroke patient’s health status).
199
For example, one study comparing the performance of four vendors
performing risk-adjustment on the same patient data found that their risk-adjusted
measurements of inpatient hospital mortality varied significantly, with forty-three
percent of hospitals showing higher-than-expected mortality under one vendor’s
method having lower-than-expected mortality under another’s methods. See Peter
Pronovost & Richard Lilford, A Road Map for Improving the Performance of Performance
Measures, 30 HEALTH AFF. 569, 569 (2011) (discussing a study of vendors’ riskadjustment performance).
200
See id. at 570 (commenting that measures calculated using discharge data are
often imprecise, as the risk for misclassification is high); Pelnar & Weiss, supra note
132, at 9 (“The reliability of metrics for measuring the quality of care is also limited
by the available data, which are likely to come from medical documentation or
claims data.”).
201
See A.E. Powell et al., Using Routine Comparative Data to Assess the Quality of
Health Care: Understanding and Avoiding Common Pitfalls, 12 QUALITY & SAFETY IN
HEALTH CARE 121, 124 (2003) (“Performance comparisons between healthcare
providers need to take into account whether the measures being compared derive
from similar patient groups, . . . so retrospective risk adjustment is required.”).
202
See id. at 124 (explaining that sophisticated risk adjustment requires detailed
information about which patients have certain characteristics).
203
See Ian Scott & Michael Ward, Public Reporting of Hospital Outcomes Based on
Administrative Data: Risks and Opportunities, 184 MED. J. OF AUSTRALIA 571 (2006)
(noting that data used for quality assessment is “often inaccurate, incomplete, or
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Comparing providers’ performance also can be hampered by
differences in the way providers record patient data. Specifically,
researchers have found that when providers are subject to quality
assessment, they often engage in “upstaging,” that is, changing how
204
they record patient data so as to increase their patients’ risk profile.
To the extent ACOs engage in upstaging, this would lead to
variations in quality scores that would be incorrectly attributed to
variations in the quality of care, rather than differences in the
205
recording of patient data.
These inherent limitations of performance measures mean that
for many domains of care, regulators cannot monitor the quality of
206
care provided by ACOs.
So while tying an ACO’s payments to its
performance on selected quality measures offers patients some
protection against under-treatment, performance measures alone will
not ensure that ACOs generate cost savings without stinting on
207
care.
provide insufficient clinical detail, with accuracy of diagnosis coding variable);
Powell, supra note 201, at 124 (the detailed information needed to conduct risk
adjustment “is rarely routinely available” in part because “the data set is incomplete
or inaccurate in certain aspects”); Welke et al., Chance, Bias, and Confounding: Threats
to Valid Measurement of Quality in the Context of Pediatric Cardiac Surgery, PEDIATRIC
CARDIAC SURGERY ANNUAL 81 (2010) (noting that often data used for quality
assessment “lack the desired granularity”).
204
See Powell et al., supra note 201, at 124 (describing the problem of
upstagingthe grading of patients over time shifting upwards, perhaps as providers
give greater attention to the initial assessment of severity).
205
As explained by one group of authors:
As the definitions of severity drift upward [due to changes in how
patient data is recorded], the highest risk patients in one category are
moved up to the next highest category where they are lower risk
relative to the other patients in the group, The highest risk patients
from that group get moved up too, so each risk category loses some of
its more severe cases and gains less severe cases. The outcomes (for
example, mortality and morbidity) for each risk category considered
separately thus appear to improve as the “pool” of severity within them
is diluted.
Id. at 124.
206
See Rachel Werner & Robert McNutt, A New Strategy to Improve Quality:
Rewarding Actions Rather Than Measures, 301 JAMA 1375, 1375 (2009) (“[Q]uality may
be feasibly measured for only a narrow and discrete portion of clinical care.”).
207
See ROBERT BERENSON & RACHEL BURTON, URBAN INST., ACCOUNTABLE CARE
ORGANIZATIONS IN MEDICARE AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR: A STATUS UPDATE 8 (Nov. 3,
2011),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412438-Accountable-CareOrganizations-in-Medicare-and-the-Private-Sector.pdf (“It is unclear whether quality
measures currently are up to the tasks assigned to them, that is, to ensure that cost
savings will not be achieved by stinting on care.”); Pelnar, supra note 132, at 6 (2011)
(stating that ACO quality measures may not ensure quality care “because restricting
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V. OVERSIGHT OF ACOS’ RATIONING OF CARE
Although ACOs have the potential to produce cost savings
without sacrificing the quality of care they provide patients, there
clearly are limits to their potential to do so. In the long-term, ACOs
cannot solve the problem of rising health care costs unless they make
compromises in the quality of care they provide to patients, including
withholding potentially beneficial care from some patients. In other
words, we should recognize that ACOs must balance cost and quality
considerations. Of fundamental importance, then, is how to best
ensure that ACOs balance cost and quality concerns in a manner that
is both reasonable and equitable. This Part concludes by briefly
highlighting some issues health analysts and policymakers should
consider in determining what regulatory oversight may be necessary
to ensure that ACOs ration health care fairly.
While in some cases limiting care on cost-benefit grounds may
be justified, as discussed in Part III.D, the financial incentives under
the ACO model could lead some providers to go too far, delaying or
denying their patients appropriate care. To guard against this risk of
under-treatment, some may advocate for aggressive regulatory
oversight of ACOs’ clinical decisions. Before imposing potentially
burdensome regulatory constraints on ACOs, however, we should
assess whether the risk of under-treatment is significant enough to
warrant a far-reaching regulatory response. Specifically, we should
examine whether certain factors temper the impact of ACOs’
financial incentives to stint on care, particularly at the level of the
individual physician. If so, a more moderate regulatory response to
the risk of under-treatment of ACO patients may be called for.
Although the financial incentives under the ACO model give
ACOs an incentive to stint on patient care, various considerations
may counteract such financial considerations. Foremost among these
factors is an ethics and culture among the medical profession which
emphasizes fidelity to patients. For example, the AMA ethical
guidelines echo long-standing ethical principles requiring physicians
to show fealty to their patients’ best interest over cost considerations,
stating that “[w]hile physicians should be conscious of costs . . . ,

or delaying care may generate cost savings without triggering a decline on reported
quality measures”); Ubl, supra note 167 (“[W]hile meeting quality measures may be a
necessary condition for quality care, it is certainly not a sufficient condition.”). For a
more optimistic view of the potential for quality measures to guard against undertreatment of ACO patients, see Zabawa et al., Adopting Accountable Care Through the
Medicare Framework, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1471 (2012).
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concern for the quality of care the patient receives should be the
208
These professional medical ethics
physician’s first consideration.”
are inculcated in physicians during their medical education and
training. As explained by Ezekiel Emanuel and Victor Fuchs:
Medical school education and postgraduate training
emphasizes thoroughness. When evaluating a patient,
students, interns, and residents are trained to identify and
praised for and graded on enumerating all possible
diagnoses and tests that would confirm or exclude them.
The thought is that the more thorough the evaluation, the
more intelligent the student or house officer. Trainees who
ignore the improbable “zebra” diagnoses are not deemed
insightful.
In medical training, meticulousness, not
209
effectiveness, is rewarded.
The physician culture further reinforces this training, with those
physicians that are thorough and aggressivewho “do everything for
the patient”held in high regard, while more prudent physicians
210
risk being deemed incompetent.
In addition, the American
medical culture values physicians being on the cutting edge of their
field, thereby encouraging use of the newest technologies and
211
techniques.
So although financial incentives will incentivize
physicians to consider the cost of care provided to patients,
professional values may deter physicians from stinting on medically
appropriate care.
Additional factors may further counteract ACOs’ financial
incentives to undertreat their patients. First, the fear of malpractice
lawsuits may deter an ACO’s participating providers from denying
their patients costly care that on balance is appropriate given its
212
potential benefits.
Competition among providers for patients
provides a second, albeit modest, counter-pressure against undertreatment. ACOs may fear that should they develop a reputation for
208

AMA Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 2.09 (2011), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/codemedical-ethics/opinion209.page?.
209
See Emanuel & Fuchs, supra note 60, at 2789–90.
210
See id.; see also Mashaw & Marmar, supra note 51, at 458 (stating that the
American medical culture promotes aggressive intervention).
211
See Mashaw & Marmar, supra note 51, at 47677 (“Our medical culture
inculcates the value of being at the cutting edge of one’s field, and that often entails
the use of the newest and often the most expensive techniques.”).
212
See Mehlman, supra note 14, at 858 (“The fear of malpractice is probably the
most effective pressure on providers to refrain from denying nonwasteful technology
to patients.”).
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providing low quality care, they may face declining demand for their
213
Finally, informed
services as patients seek alternative providers.
consent rules reinforce the malpractice and competitive
considerations that may deter ACO providers from stinting on care,
particularly in those jurisdictions that require providers to inform
patients of all available treatment options. In a culture where
patients expect to receive all potentially beneficial care, patients
informed of alternative but costly treatment options denied them by
214
their ACO understandably would be outraged.
Fearing that these
patients may file a malpractice claim or switch providers, ACO
providers who under informed consent laws must disclose to patients
alternative treatment options may hesitate to deny or delay such
215
care. In sum, together these considerations may prove a powerful
force in deterring ACO providers from delaying or denying their
patients medically appropriate care.
Despite these considerations, financial incentives likely will lead
at least some ACO providers to provide subpar care. Although tying
an ACO’s payments to its performance on various quality standards
affords patients some protection against under-treatment, additional
safeguards may be necessary given the inherent limitations of
performance measures, as discussed in Part III.D. For example, some
have advocated requiring an external appeals process that would
allow ACO patients to obtain independent medical review of their
physicians’ medical decisions (including a decision to deny or delay
216
certain treatments).
In addition, government regulators and
213

Although the difficulties faced by patients in evaluating the care they receive
may limit their ability to make informed choices among providers, some providers
nevertheless are motivated to provide high quality care in order to protect their
reputations. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A
DOSE OF COMPETITION 17 (2004) (stating that although there exists informational
and payment barriers to effective competition, competition can play an important
role in enhancing quality of care); Anne Frølich et al., A Behavioral Model of Clinician
Responses to Incentives to Improve Quality, 80 HEALTH POL’Y 179, 187 (2007) (discussing
a study of Wisconsin hospitals finding that public reporting of quality performance
made hospitals more likely to adopt quality improvement programs); David Hyman,
The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem
or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, n.364 (2005) (stating that one motive
of providers for improving quality may be concern for their reputation).
214
See Blustein & Marmor, supra note 135, at 1556 (stating that some patients
would be outraged if denied potentially beneficial care).
215
See Mehlman, supra note 14, at 860 (“One aspect of malpractice law that may
exert a particularly powerful pressure on providers to furnish patients with
nonwasteful technology is the principle of informed consent.”).
216
See Myrl Weinberg, National Health Council Comments on CMS-1345-P, at 3
(2001) (urging CMS to establish an appeals process for patients under the Medicare

2.MANTEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

10/23/2012 3:56 PM

CAN WE HAVE OUR CAKE AND EAT IT TOO?

1439

independent monitors could review a random sample of ACO patient
records to ensure that ACOs are not arbitrarily denying patients
217
appropriate treatments.
In addition to protecting patients against under-treatment at the
level of the individual patient, regulators should ensure that ACOs, at
the organizational level, have sufficient resources to meet their
patients’ needs. As discussed in Part III.D, an ACO seeking to limit
its costs may fail to maintain sufficient resources at the organizational
level to meet the full range of patients’ needs. To guard against poor
resource-allocation decisions at the organizational level, regulators
should consider whether to establish standards addressing ACOs’
capacity. For example, federal and state regulators could establish
standards intended to ensure that ACOs have a sufficient number of
specialists among its physicians. Where an ACO lacks the capacity to
itself provide the full range of medical care, regulators should
monitor whether such ACOs are denying or delaying referring
patients to outside specialists and other providers who can meet the
patients’ needs.
Regulators also should consider whether to promulgate
standards addressing ACO payment arrangements and assumption of
financial risk. For example, perhaps there should be limits on the
extent to which individual practitioners participating in ACOs face
financial risk for the cost of their individual treatment decisions, with
participating physicians instead rewarded based on their economic
performance as a group. Indeed, in its proposed waivers for the
Medicare Shared Savings Program, the Office of the Inspector
General invited comments on the potential risk of underutilization
raised from ACO physicians and other participants bearing risk for
218
the cost of care they provide to ACO patients. Similarly, for those
ACOs accepting capitation from private payors, regulatory review of
agreed-upon rates may be necessary to ensure that ACOs receive
sufficient revenue to meet their patients’ needs. Regulators also
should consider whether to establish financial solvency and cash
reserve requirements for ACOs assuming financial risk in order to
guard against financially-strapped ACOs stinting on patient care.
Shared Savings Program).
217
See Ubl, supra note 167 (proposing that “independent monitors oversee the
ACOs to protect against arbitrary ‘stinting’”). In its final rule for the Shared Savings
program, CMS stated that it will audit ACOs in order to ensure that patients receive
appropriate care. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 67967.
218
See 76 FED REG. 19655, 19660 (April 7, 2011) (inviting comments on the risk
of underutilization and stinting).

MANTEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1440

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

10/23/2012 3:56 PM

[Vol. 42:1393

In addition to concerns regarding whether ACOs will
appropriately balance cost and quality considerations, there is the
additional concern that ACOs may not allocate care equitably among
their patients, with some patients receiving higher quality care than
others. Numerous studies have documented racial, ethnic, and
gender disparities in health care. For example, a 2002 Institute of
Medicine report found that racial and ethnic minorities often receive
lower quality care relative to patients of European descent, disparities
that cannot be explained by differences in insurance coverage, access
219
to care, income, education, or patient preferences.
Other studies
have found that physicians often ignore or delay treating women’s
220
symptoms. These disparities may reflect conscious and unconscious
stereotyping and selective empathy that influence providers’
decisions. For example, in making decisions regarding the most
appropriate course of treatment, physicians take into account the
likelihood
that
patients
will
comply
with
therapeutic
recommendations, patients’ dietary practices, family and social
221
support, living conditions, pain tolerance, and other factors.
To
the extent that a patient’s race, gender, or other characteristics bias a
physician’s evaluation of these factors, there will be disparities in the
222
quality of care provided. Financial incentives to reduce costs, such
as those reflected in the ACO model, could further exacerbate these
223
disparities.
219

See COMM. ON UNDERSTANDING AND ELIMINATING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES
IN HEALTH CARE, INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: WHAT HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (2002).
220

See Michelle Oberman & Margie Schaps, Women’s Health and Managed Care, 65
TENN. L. REV. 555, 565 (1998) (discussing gender bias in physicians).
221
See Maxwell Gregg Bloche, Race and Discretion in American Medicine, 1 YALE J. OF
HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 95, 101 (2001) (describing patient characteristics that
influence physicians’ treatment decisions).
222
See id. at 104 (commenting that to the extent race-related preconceptions
affect physicians’ expectations and suppositions, racial disparities in clinical
judgment ensue). See also Barbara Noah, Racial Disparities in the Delivery of Health Care,
35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 135 (1998) (“Physicians’ treatment decisions may reflect
unstated prejudices—negative or pessimistic assumptions about their African
American patients’ family support networks, dietary practices, or adherence to
recommended post-treatment care-regimens.”).
223
Cf. Sidney Watson, Race, Ethnicity and Quality of Care: Inequalities and Incentives,
27 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 223 (stating that capitation creates special risks for minority
patients). With their emphasis on evidence-based rules for clinical decisions, to
some extent ACOs may be able to counteract the bias that leads to deviations from
appropriate care. See Bloche, supra note 221, at 118 (“Incentives to adhere to
evidence-based protocols . . . [would] penalize race-related deviations.”). However,
gaps in the clinical science and variation among patients limits the extent to which
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Should there be evidence of differential treatment among ACO
patients, regulatory action to address such inequalities may be
warranted. For example, the set of quality measures used to evaluate
ACOs’ performance could include measures that evaluate the care
224
ACOs provide to vulnerable patient populations.
In addition,
regulators could require ACOs to monitor and address disparities in
the provision of care to patients, and educate their professionals on
how gender, race, cultural and other factors may influence their
clinical judgment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although ACOs clearly have opportunities to achieve savings
without adversely impacting patient care, this Article argues that
those opportunities may be far fewer than policymakers hope. In the
long-term, ACOs cannot successfully dampen health care inflation
unless we allow them to make some compromises in the quality of
care they provide. Moreover, even if ACOs potentially could
sufficiently rein in costs while improving the quality of care, in
practice ACOs have clear financial incentives to stint on the care they
provide patients. Policymakers and scholars therefore should not
assume that ACOs will achieve savings without compromising the
quality of care they provide to patients. Instead, they should
recognize that some ACO patients will receive lower quality care as
ACOs seek to balance cost and quality considerations.
Of
fundamental importance, then, is how to best ensure that ACOs
balance cost and quality concerns in a manner that is both reasonable
and equitable, issues that merit careful deliberation and robust
debate. This Article seeks to prompt discussion of these concerns as
evidence-based rules can guide medical decision making, leaving many medical
decisions matters of professional discretion. See sources cited supra note 135 and
accompanying text. See also Bloche, supra note 221, at 101 (noting that the potential
for detailed decision rules to restraint clinical discretion is limited by empirical
uncertainty about medical interventions). Moreover, even if ACOs could develop
comprehensive evidence-based rules, the subjectivity and incompleteness in
observing and interpreting patients’ clinical signs and symptoms allows for bias to
effect the application of such rules. See Bloche, supra note 221, at 10102 (“The
scope of practitioners’ discretion is further widened by the subjectivity and inevitable
incompleteness of clinical observation and interpretation. . . . [such that] [e]ven if
we could craft a comprehensive set of evidence-based rules for clinical decision
making, this subjectivity and incompleteness would make application of the rules a
matter of considerable discretion for . . . the treating physician.”).
224
Cf. Watson, supra note 223, at 22324 (proposing that managed care
organizations receive a bonus for reducing racial disparities in medical care, as
measured by performance criteria).
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our health care delivery system continues to move toward the ACO
model.

